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I. INTRODUCTION
Representing the first international attempt to prosecute violations of
humanitarian law since the end of World War II, the United Nations Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Ter-
ritory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (Tribunal or ICTY) promises to
be an extraordinary countermeasure to the collapse in public order that oc-
curred in this jurisdiction during the early 1990s. More generally, the Tribu-
nal stands ready to contribute to the evolution of laws and customs pertaining
to the conduct of armed hostilities. For this reason, it has received close
scrutiny from observers tracking legal developments at the international
level.' Meanwhile, others have evaluated the role that the Tribunal will play
in the conflict resolution process that different facets of the international
community have been relentlessly pursuing in the region.' In contrast, few
have examined such subjects as the internal procedures that regulate the op-
eration of the Tribunal and their consistency with international human rights
norms and the imperatives of justice in polities that, like those of the former
Yugoslavia, are undergoing rapid transitions from one order to another.
This Article attempts to correct this imbalance. More specifically, it
focuses on a mechanism, set out in Rule 61 of the Tribunal's Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence,3 that provides for the reconfirmation of indictments of
1. For attempts to give content to this concept, see LON FULLER, The Problem of the Grudge
Informer, in THE MORAL=rY OF LAw 187-95 (1969); FRANZ NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL
THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYsrEm IN MODERN SOCIErY 293-98 (1986); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity
to Law, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1958); and H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Mor-
als, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958).
2. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Wiolations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1191 (1994); Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International Criminal
Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 127 (1995); Wil-
liam W. Home, The Real Trial ofthe Century, AM. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 52; Theodor Meron, The Case
for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 122; James Podgers, The World
Cries for Justice, 82 A.B.A. J. 52 (1996); Tina Rosenberg, From Nuremberg to Bosnia, 260 THE NATION
688 (1995); Cedric Thomberry, Saving the War Crimes Tribunal, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1996, at 72; The
Wor) Tries Again, ECONOMIsT, Mar. 11, 1995, at 21.
3. See International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rev
10) (visited Oct. 3, 1997) <http://www.un.org/icty/revlO-e2.htm> [hereinafter Current ICTYRules]. For
the original set of rules, see INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE
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individuals accused of committing criminal offenses that the ICTY is com-
petent to prosecute.4 Our investigation centers on two aspects of Rule 61: its
politics and the propriety of its implementation. After explaining how the
procedural rule fits into the Tribunal's founding and operation, Part II of this
Article attempts to clarify its political dimensions. Toward this end, we ex-
amine the decisionmaking process that produced Rule 61 as well as the way
in which the proceedings authorized by this provision are to unfold. In par-
ticular, we discuss the various purposes of the Rule 61 mechanism and con-
sider how subjects are selected for Rule 61 treatment.
In Part III, in discussing Rule 61's propriety, we assess the extent to
which Rule 61 functions as a trial in absentia in disguise. A survey of inter-
national and municipal regimes pertaining to the right to be present during a
criminal proceeding informs our assessment of whether, assuming that this
proceeding amounts to a trial in absentia, it is permissible for the Tribunal to
employ Rule 61. Following on the heels of this discussion is an estimate of
the extent to which this procedural device is compatible with the larger op-
erational objectives of the Tribunal and the requirements of justice in politi-
cally transitional contexts.
The beginnings of a global assessment of Rule 61 crystallize in the
course of this Article's inquiry into the issues that we address. Our analysis
suggests that the Tribunal's employment of Rule 61 flowed largely from ide-
alistic, yet flawed, assumptions about the mechanics of the criminal justice
process at the international level. In short, Tribunal decisionmakers may
have believed, somewhat naively, that their use of Rule 61 would shame na-
tional and supranational political structures into cooperation with the ICTY,
FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER
YuGOsLVIA SINCE 1991, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 484
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 I.T.R. PRoC. & EVID.].
Little analysis has focused on the multifaceted nature of Rule 61. Despite its uniqueness, the pro-
ceeding created by the rule often has warranted only a paragraph or two in texts dealing with the rules as a
whole. See COMMISSION ON SEC. AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE
FORMER YUGOsLAVIA: AN UPDATE (1996); 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S
GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUCOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 220-21 (1995); Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A
Challenge to avilization, 8 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 243 (1995); Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations
Justice or Military Justice: Which Is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 475, 486 (1995) (noting
only that trials in absentia are prohibited under the Rules); Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening Enforce-
ment of Humanitarian Lav: Reflections on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 79, 92 (1995); Nagan, supra note 2, at 127; Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRim. L.F.
507, 530 (1994) (stating that rules forbid trials in absentia); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Nontreaty Sources of the
Obligation to Investigate and Prosecute, in IMPUNIrY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 39, 53-54, 301-02 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995); Mirko Klarin, Hearing the ictims, and
the Accused, TRm., Mar. 1996, at *1; Eleanor Richter-Lyonette, Witnesses: Protection in Limbo, TPM.,
Feb. 1996, at *1; Douglas Stringer & Diane Marie Amann, International Criminal Law, 31 INT'L LAW.
611, 615 (1997) (declaring that "Rule 61 is nonetheless an innovative device"); Thornberry, supra note 2,
at 22-24.
4. For thorough discussions of the Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction, see Prosecutor v. Ta-
dic, No. IT-94-1-AR72 (I.C.T.Y. Oct. 2, 1995) (appeal on jurisdiction), 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996) [hereinafter
Tadic Appeal]; and 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 3, at 61-88.
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especially if those subjected to this instrument were, in the public's mind,
associated with the breathtaking breakdown of the former Yugoslavia.' The
failure of this collaboration to become entrenched could account for the rela-
tive brevity of the period during which Rule 61 proceedings loomed large in
the Tribunal's operation. The failure could also account for the adoption of
more pragmatic approaches to the apprehension of those suspected of com-
mitting criminal wrongdoing.'
Beyond addressing such timely empirical queries as why the Tribunal
integrated the Rule 61 proceeding into its operation, this Article argues that
this highly inventive instrument, even if it is characterized as the functional
equivalent of a trial in absentia, is consistent with international law. Rule 61
is also a viable, although potentially problematic, response to the inevitable
problems of attempting to administer justice in politically fluid environ-
ments.
7
II. THE POLITics OF RULE 61
A. The Evolution of Rule 61
The novelty of Rule 61 may be a result of the rushed nature of the de-
cisionmaking process that spawned the Tribunal and its procedural regime.
The diverse characteristics of the actors, including governments and individ-
ual jurists, who helped establish the ICTY and drafted its Rules of Procedure
and Evidence could also explain its innovative nature. Fewer than twenty-
one months elapsed between the Security Council's decision to create the
Tribunal and the confirmation of the first indictment The intervening period
was one of intense activity.9 The fact that a statute and set of procedural
5. Section lI.C, which reviews the purposes of Rule 61, discusses this claim in more detail.
6. The Tribunal's increased reliance on more pragmatic approaches to the apprehension of
some of the individuals in the former Yugoslavia who are believed to bear responsibility for this entity's
collective descent into madness may herald the end of its utility. The Tribunal has begun sealing indict-
ments rather than making them public before attempting to arrest suspects. See Charles Trueheart, U.N.
Prosecutor Sees Breakthrough in Arrest of Serb War Crimes Suspect, vASH. POST, July 1, 1997, at A12.
For accounts of recent attempts to arrest suspected individuals using this strategy, see Chris Hedges, Deci-
sion in Bosnia: The Arrests, N.Y. TmIMs, Dec. 18, 1997, at A20; Susanne M. Schafer, Clinton Terms
NATO Raid in Bosnia 'Appropriate', AP, July 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4874408; and U.N. Arrests
Serb War Crimes Suspect, L.A. TziMs, June 28, 1997, at A12. Such actions have complicated the lives of
those who have reason to fear being targeted. See Mike Corder, War Crimes Suspects Taking to the
Woods, FORT WORTH SrAR-TEOGRAM, Aug. 31, 1997, at 22.
7. See infra Section lII.C.
8. The first indictment, that of Dragan Nikolic, was confirmed on November 4, 1994. See
Prosecutor v. Nikolic, No. IT-94-2-I (I.C.T.Y. Nov. 4, 1994) (indictment), 34 I.L.M. 996 (1995) [herein-
after Nikolic Indictment].
9. This interval saw the adoption of the Tribunal's Statute. See Statute of the International Tri-
bunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1163, 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTYStatute]. For a
discussion of the process through which the Statute was created, see 1 MORRIs & SCHARF, supra note 3, at
32-35. Other obviously time-consuming activities included appointing 11 judges, selecting a chief prose-
cutor, hiring a staff to support prosecution activities and to provide administrative services to the Tribunal,
choosing a building to house the Tribunal, and drafting and adopting a procedural regime to govern the
Tribunal's operation.
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rules were hammered out with such dispatch is particularly surprising given
the long debates that have accompanied other efforts to construct interna-
tional mechanisms to prosecute violations of legal norms.
The process of creating a new international legal arrangement began on
February 22, 1993, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 808. This
directive amounted to a formal declaration of intent to establish a tribunal for
adjudicating breaches of international humanitarian law arising out of the
fighting in the former Yugoslavia. This unprecedented measure, in turn,
came as an immediate response to the first interim report of the U.N. Com-
mission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780
(1992) to Investigate War Crimes and Other Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia (Commission of Experts), a body
created by the Security Council to evaluate the increasing evidence of serious
criminal wrongdoing resulting from the violence in the region. U.N. deci-
sionmakers decided neither the exact structure and form the tribunal ulti-
mately would assume nor the legal basis upon which it would be founded;
Resolution 808 merely requested that the Secretary General study the situa-
tion and submit a report on all relevant matters. Furthermore, it encouraged
him to take into account any recommendations submitted by states."0
By May, this exercise was complete. In response to the Security Coun-
cil's request for specific proposals, the Secretary General submitted with his
report a draft statute for the Tribunal, a document largely based on the pro-
posals submitted by numerous governments, multilateral entities, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).' Given that the deterrence of further
atrocities and the elimination of an ongoing threat to international peace and
security were to be the Tribunal's principal aims, 2 the Secretary General
proposed that the Security Council use its Chapter VII powers under the
U.N. Charter to create an ad hoc court (alternative treaty-based approaches,
10. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993) [hereinafter Resolution 808] (requesting Secretary General to report on establishment of interna-
tional criminal tribunal).
11. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEMORANDUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS: THE
QUESTION OF JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 3, at 409 [hereinafter Al PROPOSAL]; CSCE
Moscow HUMAN DIMENSION MECHANISM TO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA, PROPOSAL FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuGOsLAVIA (1993), reprinted in 2 MORRIS &
SCHARF, supra note 3, at 211 [hereinafter CSCE PROPOSAL]; Report from the Permanent Representative of
Sveden to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doe. S/25307 (1993)
(containing table of contents and summary of CSCE PROPOSAL, supra); Letter Dated 10 February 1993
from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,
Annex 2, U.N. Doe. S/25266 (1993), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 3, at 327, 362 [here-
inafter French Proposal]; Letter Dated 16 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doe. S/25300 (1993), reprinted in 2 MORRIS &
SCHARF, supra note 3, at 375 [hereinafter Italian Proposal]; Letter Dated 5 April 1993 from the Permanent
,Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doe. S/25537 (1993), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 3, at 439; Letter Dated 5 April 1993
from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the
Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doe. S/25575 (1993), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 3, at
451.
12. See Resolution 808, supra note 10, at 1.
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it was thought, would have been too arduous and time-consuming).13 The Se-
curity Council adopted this draft statute without revision on May 25, 1993,
and appended it to Resolution 827, the instrument that formally created the
ICTY.
14
Besides delineating the Tribunal's jurisdiction and guaranteeing mini-
mum rights to the accused, the Statute vested power in the Tribunal's eleven
judges to adopt the procedural and evidentiary rules necessary to conduct tri-
als. 5 Once elected and sworn in, these individuals made adoption of stan-
dards an immediate priority. With a collection of proposals submitted by
various states and organizations as well as drafts penned by the judges them-
selves, 6 negotiations concerning the proposed rules dominated the Tribunal's
first and second plenary sessions in late 1993 and early 1994. Although the
Statute provided a general framework for the rule-drafting work, the chal-
lenges of the process were unique.' 7 Following extensive debate at the sec-
ond plenary session," the judges ultimately adopted a set of procedural and
evidentiary standards on February 11, 1994.19
13. See ICTY Statute, supra note 9, 22. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) had proposed that the Tribunal be created through the conclusion of a treaty and that the
court be empowered to adjudicate violations of Yugoslav national law interpreted in the light of Yugosl a-
via's international commitments. See CSCE PROPOSAL, supra note 11, at 240, 251.
14. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 60, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
[hereinafter Resolution 827].
15. See ICTYStatute, supra note 9, art. 15.
16. See I MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 3, at 176-77.
17. The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials provided the ICTY judges with only sparse
precedent to guide them in drafting the rules. In both previous instances, many of the procedural matters
usually determined by a prewritten set of rules were decided in case-by-case judicial rulings. The proce-
dural guidelines that regulated the operation of the Nuremberg Tribunal were set out in 11 rules; at Tokyo,
there were only nine. The judges of the ICTY, however, adopted 125 rules. See First Annual Report of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., Agenda Item 152, 54, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1007 (1994) [hereinafter First Annual Report]. In their
discussion of the difficulties encountered in the rule-drafting process, Morris and Scharf note the "striking
difference in the attention devoted to the substantive and the procedural aspects of international criminal
law since Nuremberg," a discrepancy that "is understandable given the failed efforts to establish an inter-
national criminal court which would require consideration of the procedural and evidentiary rules of law
governing its proceedings." 1 MoRIS & SCHARF, supra note 3, at 175.
18. See First Annual Report, supra note 17, 55.
19. See Current ICTYRules, supra note 3, at 1. Judging from the proposals for the Statute and
Rules officially submitted by states, NGOs, and multilateral organizations, the idea of a public reconfirma-
tion of indictments as a response to state noncooperation and nonappearance of the accused seems to have
first been hatched outside the Tribunal's chambers. Submissions by both the Organization of the Islamic
Conference and Amnesty International called for public reconfirmation proceedings to be included in the
Tribunal's procedures months before the judges debated the rules. Amnesty International's proposal, which
bears a striking resemblance to the rule ultimately adopted, recommended:
If the accused has been properly notified of the date and place of the trial and he or she
willfully refuses to appear, the Tribunal could hold a preliminary hearing. By establishing
the facts of where, how and when a particular incident occurred, this hearing could begin to
reveal the truth, for the benefit of victims and the community .... The determination of
guilt or innocence of an individual, however, would be left to a subsequent trial in the pres-
ence of the accused.
AI PROPOSAL, supra note 11, at 426.
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B. Rule 61 in Its Current Form
In its current form, Rule 61 provides:
Procedure in Case of Failure to Execute a Warrant
(A) If, within a reasonable time, a warrant of arrest has not been executed, and per-
sonal service of the indictment has consequently not been effected, the Judge
who confirmed the indictment shall invite the Prosecutor to report on the meas-
ures he has taken. When the Judge is satisfied that:
(i) the Prosecutor has taken all reasonable steps to effect personal service, in-
cluding recourse to the appropriate authorities of the State in whose territory
or under whose jurisdiction and control the person to be served resides or
was last known to him to be; and
(ii) the Prosecutor has otherwise tried to inform the accused of the existence of
the indictment by seeking publication of newspaper advertisements pursuant
to Rule 60, the Judge shall order that the indictment be submitted by the
Prosecutor to his Trial Chamber.
(B) Upon obtaining such an order the Prosecutor shall submit the indictment to the
Trial Chamber in open court, together with all the evidence that was before the
Judge who initially confirmed the indictment. The Prosecutor may also call be-
fore the Trial Chamber and examine any witness whose statement has been
submitted to the confirming Judge.
(C) If the Trial Chamber is satisfied on that evidence, together with such additional
evidence as the Prosecutor may tender, that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged in the
indictment, it shall so determine. The Trial Chamber shall have the relevant
parts of the indictment read out by the Prosecutor together with an account of
the efforts to effect service referred to in Sub-rule (A) above.
(D) The Trial Chamber shall also issue an international arrest warrant in respect of
the accused which shall be transmitted to all States. Upon request by the Prose-
cutor or proprio motu, after having heard the Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber
may order a State or States to adopt provisional measures to freeze the assets of
the accused, without prejudice to the rights of third parties.
(E) If the Prosecutor satisfies the Trial Chamber that the failure to effect personal
service was due in whole or in part to a failure or refusal of a State to cooperate
with the Tribunal in accordance with Article 29 of the Statute, the Trial Cham-
ber shall so certify. After consulting the Presiding Judges of the Chambers, the
President shall notify the Security Council thereof in such manner as he thinks
fit.
20
A quintessential example of what Antonio Cassese, the Tribunal's first
President and a prominent scholar of international law, has described as
"purpose-made rules, " " Rule 61 called for an innovative procedural solu-
tion:
If... the accused does not present himself or is not surrendered to the Tribunal, the
indictment may then be submitted to one of the trial chambers for reconfirmation. At
that time the indictment and all supporting evidence will be submitted in open session.
If the Trial Chamber is satisfied that a primafacie case has been established, it shall is-
sue an international arrest warrant to be transmitted to all States through the Interna-
tional Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Furthermore, if the Trial Chamber
is satisfied that the failure to execute the warrant was the result of failure by a State to
cooperate with the Tribunal, the President shall notify the Security Council accord-
ingly.22
20. Current ICTYRules, supra note 3, Rule 61.
21. First Annual Report, supra note 17, 75.
22. Id. 193.
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With the rule-drafting process completed, the Tribunal was functionally
prepared to commence operation. The rules essentially were a work in prog-
ress, however: Not only were they assembled hastily,' but they contained
liberal amendment provisions.24 The judges, the Prosecutor, and the Regis-
trar could suggest alterations.25 As a result, through July 1995, forty-one of
the 125 original rules adopted in February 1994 were amended at least once,
and one completely new rule was added. To date, Rule 61 has been altered
on at least five occasions.
The modifications made to Rule 61 mean that the proceedings it
authorizes now begin with the confirming judge inviting the Prosecutor to
report on the measures taken to execute an arrest warrant in a given case. If
the Prosecutor satisfies the judge that a credible effort to effect service has
occurred,' the indictment, along with all previously tendered evidence, is
submitted to the judge's trial chamber. 27 At the discretion of the Prosecutor,
witnesses may be called and examined in an open courtroom proceeding. If,
upon completion of this process, a majority of the chamber finds that "that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed all
or any of the crimes charged in the indictment,"' the Prosecutor reads out
the relevant parts of the reconfirmed indictment.29
The reconfirmation of an indictment gives Tribunal judges several ad-
ditional options to facilitate the arrest of individuals wanted by the ICTY.
First, they gain the authority to issue international arrest warrants with re-
spect to the accused. Whereas the original warrant is operative only in the
23. President Cassese has profferred four reasons for the rapidity with which the rules were
adopted: Drafting the rules quickly increased the likelihood that the Tribunal's work might have a deterrent
effect; neither the work of the court nor that of the Prosecutor could commence until the rules were co m-
plete; early adoption would give states additional time to enact domestic legislation governing cooperation
with the Tribunal; and the rapid publication of rules would allow interested parties to recommend amend-
ments. See id. 56.
24. Rule 6 reads:
(A) Proposals for amendment of the Rules may be made by a Judge, the Prosecutor or
the Registrar and shall be adopted if agreed to by not less than seven Judges at a p] e-
nary meeting of the Tribunal convened with notice of the proposal addressed to all
Judges.
(B) An amendment to the Rules may be otherwise adopted, provided it is unanimously
approved by the Judges.
(C) An amendment shall enter into force immediately, but shall not operate to prejudice
the rights of the accused in any pending case.
Current ICTYRules, supra note 3, Rule 6. The provision allowing for amendment based on the agreement
of seven Judges is particularly interesting given that only those standards upon which the Judges reached
broad consensus were adopted in the original set of rules. See First Annual Report, supra note 17, 53.
25. See Current ICTYRules, supra note 3, Rule 6.
26. Notwithstanding the fact hat Rule 61 requires that the Prosecutor prove that all reasonable
steps have been taken to effect personal service, transmission of arrest warrants to states falls within the
purview of the Registry-the administrative arm of the Tribunal-as set out in Rule 55(B). This task is also
ultimately implemented by the Registry. See id. Rule 55(B).
27. The Tribunal is staffed by 11 judges. Five comprise the Appeals Chamber; there are also
two trial chambers, each with three judges. For information on the selection of judges, see Judges in Elec-
toral Campaign for Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 8, 1997, available in
1997 WL 2111104.
28. See Current IClYRules, supra note 3, Rule 61(C).
29. See id.
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jurisdiction where the confirmee is thought to reside, authorities can execute
reconfirmation warrants anywhere. Moreover, if the Tribunal President be-
lieves that the failure to effect personal service stems from the relevant
authorities' unwillingness to cooperate with the Tribunal, he or she may, af-
ter consulting with the presiding judges, notify the Security Council of this
lack of assistance.3" Under the U.N. Charter, this entity would be empow-
ered not only to order the arrest of an individual suspected of criminal
wrongdoing but also to employ any means necessary to ensure his or her
conveyance into the Tribunal's custody. Finally, only in the wake of a Rule
61 proceeding may the ICTY preside over the seizure of assets thought to
belong to the accused.
C. Possible Rationales for Rule 61"1
Rule 61 was designed to enable the Tribunal to accomplish a variety of
goals, including pressuring influential actors in the Yugoslav drama to com-
ply with its dictates. Several indicators point to this political aspect of the
Rule.
1. Rule 61 and the Subversion of Political Obstacles Facing the Tri-
bunal
The Tribunal's decision to create the Rule 61 proceeding can be seen as
a way to avoid being thwarted by uncooperative political actors. These enti-
ties include the disputants in the former Yugoslavia themselves,32 countries
30. See id. Rule 61(e). The evidentiary standards required for reconfirmation of an indictment
under Rule 61 are identical to those of the initial confirmation process. According to Rule 47(A), once the
Prosecutor finds that there is "sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect
has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, he shall prepare and forward to the Registrar
an indictment for confirmation by a Judge." Current ICTY Rules, supra note 3, Rule 47(A). The Statute,
however, requires in article 18(4) that the Prosecutor determine that a prima facie case exists before sub-
mitting an indictment. Morris and Scharf report that because the definition of "prima facie" varies from
one legal system to another, the judges avoided having to confront this ambiguity head-on by establishing a
set standard for reconfirmation in the rules and omitting the phrase "prima facie" altogether. See 1 MoRRis
& SCHARF, supra note 3, at 202. For another view on the evidentiary rules utilized by the Tribunal, see
Rod Dixon, Developing International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 7
TRtANSNAT'LL. & CONTEm'. PROBs. 81 (1997).
31. This Section's theoretical underpinnings are rooted in the legal realist claim that both sub-
stantive and procedural law (assuming that there is a meaningful distinction between these two realms) are
driven by their underlying political, social, and economic context.
32. In his second annual report, former President Cassese noted that "[tihe degree of coopera-
tion with the Tribunal exhibited by the different States and authorities varies considerably, from excellent
(Sarajevo and Zagreb) to poor (Belgrade, Knin, and Pale)." Second Annual Report of the International Tri-
bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item
49, 50, U.N. Doe. Sf1995/728 (1995) [hereinafter Second Annual Report]. Only in February and March
of 1996 did Serbia begin to cooperate with the Tribunal. See Bosnia Killings Inquiry Advances, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 15, 1996, at 2 (reporting that Serbia agreed to hand over two key witnesses of Srebrenica
massacre). At the same time, this collaboration proved to be fleeting. In late April, Cassese called for
sanctions against Serbia after it stopped cooperating with the Tribunal. Some prosecution officials have
predicted publicly that the Serb posture towards the ICTY may change as Serbia realizes that cooperation is
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around the world that might attempt to harbor individuals suspected of com-
mitting criminal wrongdoing in this region since 1991, and jurisdictions that,
for various reasons, have displayed a lack of enthusiasm for the Tribunal
venture.33 Without its own policing organ, the ICTY ran the risk of existing
on the border of irrelevance. What was then left of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) openly challenged the Tribunal's legitimacy in May 1993.1
4
Moreover, as the judges began to draft the rules, reports increased that am-
nesties might be included in the bundle of inducements to settle their differ-
ences being dangled in front of the warring factions.3 Besides transforming
the Tribunal into a more multidimensional entity in terms of the activities it
carried out,36 Rule 61 hearings ensured that the failure on the part of
authorities in various national and non-state entity jurisdictions to comply
with its dictates did not render it impotent. In fact, individuals attached to the
Tribunal have continually invoked this justification for the Rule 61 proce-
dure.
37
in its best interest. For example, permitting the Prosecutor to establish an office in Belgrade and allowing
Tribunal personnel freedom of movement in Serbia might make it possible for Serbs who witnessed crimi-
nal wrongdoing (which presumably would have been committed by non-Serbs) to be interviewed. For more
on the cooperation that various authorities extended to the Tribunal during its third year of operation, see
Third Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since
1991, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 50, 172-173, U.N. Doc. S/1996/665 (1996) [hereinafter
ThirdAnnual Report].
33. See Resolution 827, supra note 14, at 60 (mandating full state cooperation with Tribunal, in-
cluding taking "any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the pre s-
ent resolution and the Statute"). As of late 1996, the vast majority of non-European countries-including
China, one of the permanent members of the Security Council-had failed to pass implementing legislation
to comply with this portion of Security Council Resolution 827. The Russian Federation has indicated that
it does not need to modify its law to comply with Tribunal orders. See Third Annual Report, supra note 32,
184.
34. See Belgrade Says Plans for War Crimes Court Are Biased, REUTE , May 21, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. For more on the role of bias in the Tribunal's operation,
see Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An Interim Assessment, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 15, 20-21 (1997), which discusses requirements for the Tribunal to be perceived as im-
partial.
35. See Stanley Meisler, Jury Still Out on Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal Created by U.N., L.A.
71vtrs, Dec. 25, 1993, at A5. Earlier that year, General Philippe Morillon, the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) commander, had advocated a general amnesty for all suspected war criminals as the
only way to bring peace to the region. See David Ottaway, U.N. Official Blasts Serbs' Death Penalty,
HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 31, 1993, at All. The possibility of amnesty, which would have infuriated hu-
man rights constituencies, has resurfaced at various points, such as during the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio
preceding the entry into force of a peace agreement designed to end the fighting in the region. See General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, art. 6, 35
I.L.M. 75, 138 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton Agreement]; Ian Geoghegan, U.N. Prosecutor Warns Against
Bosnia Amnesties, RFurERS, Nov. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (alluding
to possibility of resignations at Tribunal if peace agreement included amnesties); Kurt Schork, Role of Bos-
nian Serb War Criminals Clouds Talks, REuTERS, Nov. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File (citing Justice Goldstone's declaration that Tribunal would not recognize amnesties).
36. See infra Subsection IfI.C.3.
37. See ICTY Press and Information Office, Rule 61: The Voice of the Victims, Information
Memorandum 1 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Voice of the Victims]
(stressing utility of Rule 61 proceeding in limited circumstances when "accused has voluntarily eluded jus-
tice; the authorities of the territory concerned have not succeeded in locating him; or else those same
authorities have refused to cooperate with the Tribunal"); see also Prosecutor v. Nikolic, No. IT-94-2-
R61, 2 (I.C.T.Y. Oct. 9, 1995) (opening statement by Justice Goldstone) [hereinafter Nikolic Opening
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2. Reconfirmation as a Prod to the Security Council
Rule 61 proceedings may function as a vehicle by which the Tribunal
can pressure the Security Council to use its authority, including its enforce-
ment powers pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to compel those
the ICTY has accused to appear before it." Justice Richard Goldstone's as-
sertion that "[t]he success of these Rule 61 proceedings will depend upon the
actions of Member States and of the Security Council" lends support to this
idea. 9 The scenario set out in Rule 61(E) actually marks the second point
during the prosecution process at which the judges are authorized to notify
the Security Council of a given jurisdiction's lack of cooperation with the
Tribunal. The first opportunity arises upon the failure to execute the initial
indictment. Rule 59 provides:
(A) Where the State to which a warrant of arrest has been transmitted has been un-
able to execute the warrant, it shall report forthwith its inability to the Regis-
trar, and the reasons therefor.
(B) If, within a reasonable time after the warrant of arrest has been transmitted to
the State, no report is made on action taken, this shall be deemed a failure to
execute the warrant of arrest and the Tribunal, through the President, may no-
tify the Security Council accordingly.Ao
Although little might come about as a result of the Tribunal's notification of
the Security Council that its initial arrest warrant had gone unexecuted, a
Statement] (noting that Tribunal judges had to decide "whether, in the event of the non-execution of a wa r-
rant, the Tribunal should allow its process to remain indefinitely suspended or whether there was some ac-
tion, short of a trial in absentia that could be taken by it. In that context the judges fashioned the innovative
provision of Rule 61"). Later in his statement, Justice Goldstone noted that "[t]he failure by the accused to
come forward and stand trial and the complicity of any Member State or defacto administration should not
be allowed to effectively close the mouths of [the] victims [of violations of international humanitarian
law]." Id. 15.
38. In one letter transmitted to the Security Council, President Cassese reported on the failure of
the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)] to execute arrest warrants against three ac-
cused-Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sjivancanin-all of whom are on its territory and who
are charged with the murder of 260 civilians and other unarmed men following the fall of the city of Vuk o-
var in November 1991. Report from the President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pe r-
sons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 Addressed to the President of the Security Council 1, U.N. Doc.
S/1996/319 (1996). A similar measure was taken in the wake of the Tribunal's move to reconfirm the in-
dictments against Karadzic and Mladic in July 1996. See Jonathan C. Randal, 'Mandatory'Arrest Warrants
Issued for Indicted Bosnian Serb Leaders; War Crimes Tribunal Challenges NATO to Seize Karadzic,
Mladic, WASH. Posr, July 12, 1996, at A30.
If the primary objective of Rule 61 is to put a political structure like the Security Council on notice
that the Tribunal does not possess the capability to deal with a given situation due to limits on its enforce-
ment abilities, comparisons between this mechanism and ones like outlawry are appropriate. Outlawry was
a procedure utilized by a number of European jurisdictions during the Middle Ages that granted license to
the larger community summarily to hunt down and kill individuals subjected to it. See CHARLES E. MILES,
INSITTONS, GAME THEORY, AND THE LAW IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 62 (1993). Similarly, it can be ar-
gued that Rule 61 hearings legitimize Security Council action to apprehend individuals suspected of in-
volvement in criminal wrongdoing in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, as the world saw in Somalia, such
actions can involve extraordinary amounts of violence even if their aim is merely the arrest of a given pe r-
son.
39. Nikolic Opening Statement, supra note 37, 14.
40. Current ICTY Rules, supra note 3, Rule 59.
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Rule 61 proceeding might propel the Security Council to act. Such hearings,
after all, might include emotionally charged testimony by witnesses and vic-
tims and receive extensive media play.
The Security Council, upon establishing the ICTY, may not have envi-
sioned being called by it to take specific actions vis-A-vis the situation in the
former Yugoslavia. Indeed, neither Security Council Resolution 827 nor the
Tribunal's Statute specifically empowers the ICTY President to notify the
Security Council of a given state's failure to cooperate.4" The language of
Resolution 827 mandating state cooperation with the Tribunal, if read rather
expansively, might be construed to confer upon ICTY personnel an implied
license to inform the Security Council that states had failed to comply with
its orders.42 However, the Tribunal's lack of leverage over this body has
been painfully apparent to key ICTY decisionmakers. Justice Goldstone, for
example, has observed:
As one would expect, the Rules of the Tribunal do not attempt to prescribe appropriate
action by the Security Council in the event of a notification to it by the President under
Rule 61. The [U.N.] Charter gives a wide discretion to the Security Council in such an
event and obviously the imposition of sanctions or at least the threat of sanctions is the
kind of action that readily comes to mind.
4 3
Nor is the Security Council under an explicit legal obligation to take
any particular measure to ensure the execution of the Tribunal's international
arrest warrants. 44 Moreover, now that the United Nations has subcontracted
day-to-day operational control of the international community's military ac-
tivities in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
41. Only article 34 of the Statute, which mandates that the Tribunal submit a yearly report to the
Security Council on its activities, imposes any sort of reporting or notification obligation on the Tribunal.
See ICTYStatute, supra note 9, art. 34.
42. See Resolution 827, supra note 14, at 2. The Security Council's general exhortation regard-
ing the importance of state cooperation with the ICTY, which has formed part of various resolutions, in-
cluding 1031, 1034, and 1037, can be read as the Security Council's response to the communications from
the Tribunal. See S.C. Res. 1037, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3619th mtg. 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1037
(1996) (reaffirming that "all States shall cooperate fully" with the ICTY); S.C. Res. 1034, U.N. SCOR,
50th Sess., 3612th mtg. 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1034 (1995) (same); S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th
Sess., 3607th mtg. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995) (same). From a diplomatic standpoint, it makes
sense to keep dialogue between the Security Council and the Tribunal to a minimum. After all, a noncom-
pliant state might occupy one of the rotating seats on the Security Council. In an even less desirable sce-
nario, the object of the Tribunal's ire might be one of the five permanent members of this body. In this
case, such moves by the Tribunal would be likely to produce much ill will. In 1996, however, President
Cassese became more vociferous in his calls for the international community, acting through the Security
Council, to take a harder line with the parties in the Balkans that had proven uncooperative with the Tribu-
nal. See UN Should Punish Belgrade for Refusing to Deliver Karadzjc, AGcEcE FRANCE Pm , July 12,
1996, available in 1996 WL 3886752 (describing Cassese's calls to reimpose limited economic sanctions).
43. Nikolic Opening Statement, supra note 37, 7.
44. The importance of maintaining clear lines of communication between the Security Council
and entities in the U.N. system that are attempting to resolve disputes through judicial means has been
hammered home by the struggle between the International Court of Justice (IC) and the Security Council
over managing the international community's response to the destruction of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland in 1988. See W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 83 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 87, 89 (1993) (including detailed analysis of this episode as well as sophisticated policy prescrip-
tion for avoiding future problems).
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(NATO),45 it is not clear that the Security Council possesses the authority to
compel this military alliance's implementation force (IFOR)46 or stabilization
force (SFOR)47 to take any specific actions.48 Although article 53 of the U.N.
Charter does empower the Security Council to "utilize . . . regional ar-
rangements or agencies for enforcement actions,"4 9 NATO has refused to be
classified as such, even though it has become heavily involved in the inter-
national community's response to the Bosnia conflict." During its existence,
IFOR did provide some support to the Tribunal by protecting its investiga-
tors and conducting suspected war criminals to the Tribunal's seat at The
Hague." However, the commanders of this force, like their United Nations
45. See S.C. Res. 1031, supra note 42.
46. For the 12-month period following the signing of the Dayton Agreement, NATO's military
activities in Bosnia were carried out under the auspices of IFOR. See Joseph W. Ralston, U.S. Policy on
Bosnia, Federal Document Clearing House, Sept. 25, 1996, available in 1997 WL 10831421 (discussing
IFOR's accomplishments).
47. Planners changed the IFOR designation to the more optimistic-sounding acronym SFOR, or
stabilization force, after the first year of NATO's involvement in the former Yugoslavia.
48. Given the changing nature of the international community's engagement in the Balkans,
which was codified in the Dayton Agreement, the fact that there is little mention of NATO or the Organi-
zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the latest version of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence is surprising. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 35, art. 10, at 134 (providing for formulation of
procedures). In theory, these two organizations are ideally situated to provide support to the Tribunal.
There are also advantages to the Tribunal's dealing with them directly. First, complicated chains of
command would be avoided. These have already hampered the activities of the international community in
the former Yugoslavia. Observers criticized the "dual key" approach to the activation of military force by
the international community that called for "U.N. civilians to approve NATO air power." Tom Post &
Rod Nordland, For Shame, NEwSWEEK, July 31, 1995, at 21, 26. This system was abandoned in the face
of the protest against the United Nations's decision not to contest the seizure of the "safe havens" of Zepa
and Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb military units in July 1995. By September, NATO warplanes were en-
gaged in punishing air strikes against Bosnian Serb military positions to compel this party to negotiate with
the other disputants in the region. See NATO Continues Air Assault, DEs Moms REG., Sept. 1, 1995, at
12 (reporting that "NATO jets struck at Bosnian Serb ammunition depots near Sarajevo today, the third
consecutive day of airstrikes intended to punish the rebels for shelling civilians and push them toward a
negotiated peace").
Also, by interacting with NATO and the OSCE directly, the Tribunal would effectively be able to
execute an end run around possible Russian and Chinese vetoes of enforcement actions to bring suspected
criminals to justice. Both countries are more apt than France, the United Kingdom, or the United States to
oppose such moves. Moscow sees the situation in the Balkans from behind a generally pro-Serb lens.
Meanwhile, the Chinese, who can be counted upon to be very conscious of national sovereignty, will o p-
pose international action directed at particular members of the international community because of the
precedent that such efforts set. For example, China abstained from the Security Council directive author-
izing the use of force by the Desert Storm military alliance against Iraq in 1991. See Major Garrett, White
House Faces Battle on Beijing's Status, WASH. TIMS, May 28, 1991, at A3 (reporting that "China voted
to 'abstain' during U.N. Security Council deliberations over the resolution authorizing force against Iraq").
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 53, 1.
50. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 730 (Bruno Simma ed.,
1995). If NATO possesses the authority to carry out unilateral military interventions, it would seem to fo I-
low that it could refuse to abide by the Security Council's dictates. As a practical matter, the fact that three
permanent members of the Security Council play important roles in NATO decreases the likelihood of con-
flicts breaking out between these two organizations.
51. See Gregory Katz, 2 Bosnian Serbs Extradited to Face War-Crimes Tribunal, DALLAs
MORNING NEws, Feb. 13, 1996, at Al (reporting apprehension of two Serb officers suspected of crimes);
NATO Must Safeguard Evidence, MILWAUKEE J. SENTNEL, Jan. 23, 1996, at 8 (noting NATO's refusal to
help guard suspected grave sites and alleging inadequate NATO role in arrests). It is clear that IFOR/SFOR
does not provide protection to all aspects of the Tribunal's investigative activities in the former Yugoslavia
but merely tries to create a safe environment for its operations. See, e.g., Morning Edition: Admiral
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Protection Force (UNPROFOR) counterparts, resisted the urge to cross the
"Mogadishu Line."52 To a limited extent, IFOR's successor, SFOR, has
bowed to pressure from various constituencies and ventured into the ambi-
tious but risky business of gaining custody over those wanted by the Tribu-
nal. 3
3. Rule 61 and the Provision of Artificial Respiration to the Tribunal
The decision to integrate a reconfirmation proceeding into the Tribu-
nal's procedural regime might be an attempt to justify the Tribunal's contin-
ued existence. From the time of Rule 61's creation in May 1993 until Ger-
many agreed to convey Dusan Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, into the Tribunal's
custody nearly two years later, it was unclear whether any trials would take
place. During an interview with American Lawyer, M. Cherif Bassiouni, a
head of the U.N. Commission, who has sometimes been critical of the
ICTY, asserted: "You should call your story the 'Potemkin Tribunal' ....
They have a magnificent building in The Hague, a great prosecution team.
But in the end when you look behind that to see what's there, the answer is
'not much.'" ' Thus, Rule 61 may function as a rejoinder to those who com-
plained about the Tribunal's inaction in the face of the massive denials of
human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law that
were, until late 1995, still occurring in the former Yugoslavia.55 The fact
that the judges altered the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to allow them to
Leighton Smith Relates NATO Progress in Bosnia (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 22, 1996) ("Our
mission is to provide general security in the area so that those agencies [like the Tribunal] doing the work
can go about their business uninterrupted. So, I would tell you we're not going to be providing security for
individuals, we're going to be establishing a secure environment in which these kinds of jobs can be un-
dertaken.").
52. This term was coined by Sir Michael Rose, a British military officer who served as com-
mander of UNPROFOR. He insisted that U.N. forces never become involved in the ongoing hostilities in
Bosnia. See Christopher Bellamy, Army Thinkers Draw Line Between Peace and War, INDEPENDENT
(London), Jan. 24, 1997, at 12 (asserting that "[c]rossing the consent line, what Gen. Sir Michael Rose
called the 'Mogadishu line' after the US switch to more warlike operations in Somalia in October 1993,
was akin to crossing the Rubicon").
53. See sources cited supra note 6; Mike Corder, NATO Raid Brings Bosnian Serb War Crimes
Suspect to U.N. Jail, AP, July 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2538940 (describing NATO raid and sei-
zure of suspected war criminals).
54. Home, supra note 2, at 61 (quoting M. Cherif Bassiouni). Contemporary journalistic ac-
counts bolster this claim. Indeed, Tyler Marshall, a reporter, sees Rule 61 as a device "to create a sem-
blance of movement." Tyler Marshall, Lack of Arrests Undercuts Tribunal, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1996, at
14; see also Second Annual Report, supra note 32, 171 (admitting that initial administrative tasks faced
by Prosecution "were not initially helpful to the Tribunal when it came to overcoming the skepticism ex-
pressed throughout the first months of its existence").
55. In his annual report, former President Cassese noted that during late April 1995, which saw
the transfer of Tadic to the Tribunal's custody and the announcement of investigations of key members of
the Bosnian Serb leadership, "[miany articles and televised reports (134 were counted) were published or
broadcast .... The most eloquent headline was probably the one which appeared in the Amsterdam daily
De Telegraaf on 27 April 1995: 'The paper tiger is roaring.'" Second Annual Report, supra note 32,
180. Since then, the credibility of the Tribunal has continued to grow. See Therese Raphael, The War
Crimes Tribunal Has C/out, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1996, at A14. Over a year later, in the wake of various
"snatch" missions that netted several more suspects, key observers are still impressed. See Bosnia Trial
Shows Court's Rising C/out, ClmiriAN Sci. MONrrOR, Oct. 1, 1997, at 6.
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initiate Rule 61 proceedings sua sponte lends credence to this view.56 So
does the Tribunal's preoccupation with the image that it projects to the out-
side world and its portrayal by the media. 7 If Rule 61 proceedings did func-
tion as a way for the Tribunal to prove its commitment to bringing to justice
those accused of criminal wrongdoing, it could be argued that there will be
fewer such proceedings in the near future. In May 1997, the Tribunal con-
victed the first individual to be tried, Dusan Tadic 8 Moreover, as of De-
cember 1997, twenty individuals were in the Tribunal's custody and awaiting
trial. 9 These proceedings likely will eclipse the symbolic value of holding
Rule 61 hearings.'
Observers of the Tribunal ignore the politics undergirding Rule 61 at
their peril. At the same time, other imperatives, although secondary to the
political motivations lying behind the utilization of this procedural rule, play
a role in the Rule 61 story. These include the realization of such worthwhile
goals as vindicating international legal principles as well as offering solace to
the victims of the trauma that enveloped the former Yugoslavia.
56. The original version of Rule 61(A) provided that "[i]f, within a reasonable time, a warrant
of arrest has not been executed, and personal service of the indictment has consequently not been effected,
and the Prosecutor satisfies a Judge of a Trial Chamber that: (i) .... " 1994 I.T.R. PRoc. & EviD., supra
note 3, at 518. The current version reads: "If, within a reasonable time, a warrant of arrest has not been
executed, and personal service of the indictment has consequently not been effected, the Judge who con-
firmed the indictment shall invite the Prosecutor to report on the measures he has taken. When the Judge is
satisfied that: (i) .... " Current ICTYRules, supra note 3, Rule 61(A).
Before the Rules of Procedure and Evidence were changed to allow the Tribunal's judges to initiate
them, only one Rule 61 proceeding took place. In the wake of these changes, reconfirmation hearings for
seven individuals occurred in an interval of less than seven months. Interestingly, a judge initiated the one
hearing that took place before this amendment. Indeed, the ruling issued in the Nikolic proceeding noted
that Judge Odio Benito ordered the Prosecutor to submit Dragan Nikolic's indictment to the trial chamber
for review. See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, No. IT-94-2-R61 (I.C.T.Y. Oct. 9, 1995) (Rule 61 hearing).
57. Approximately ten percent of the Tribunal's second annual report to the Security Council
deals with the Tribunal's interactions with the press. See Second Annual Report, supra note 32, 163-64;
Thi rd Annual Report, supra note 32, 152-60.
58. For commentary on Tadic's conviction, see Charles Trueheart, U.N. Tribunal Finds Bosnian
Serb Guilty: Verdict Is Hague's First in a Contested Case, WAsH. POST, May 8, 1997, at A20; and Tracy
Wilkinson, Bosnian Serb Is Convicted of War Crimes, L.A. TIMEs, May 8, 1997, at Al.
59. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, List of Detainees (visited
Nov. 1, 1997) <http://www.un.orglictyll9deten.htm>.
60. In addition, statements made by individuals attached to the Prosecution, combined with the
Tribunal's budgetary constraints, cast doubt on whether the Office of the Prosecutor possesses the capacity
simultaneously to try cases, conduct investigations, and participate in reconfirmation proceedings. With
trials likely to Ioom larger in the life of the Tribunal, a limited number of courtrooms may also mean that
the days of Rule 61 proceedings are numbered. See Second Annual Report, supra note 32, 31 (drawing
attention to "a critical resource limitation of the Tribunal [:] ... its small capacity to hear trials"); see also
Third Annual Report, supra note 32, 72 ("The need for adequate funding to be provided for the con-
struction of a second courtroom... cannot be overemphasized."). The Tribunal's shortage of courtroom
space has had a very real impact on its ability to administer justice. When Karadzic and Mladic were sub-
jected to a Rule 61 hearing in July 1996, a recess in the Tadic trial lasting several weeks had to be ordered.
In 1997, the newly elected British Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair came to the Tribunal's
rescue by agreeing to finance the construction of an extra courtroom. See Michael Binyon, Britain Is to
Pay Pounds 330,000 for New War Crimes Court, TIMES (London), July 18, 1997, at 15.
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4. Rule 61 and the Need to Avoid Holding Trials in Absentia
During its early days, many observers believed that allowing trials in
absentia would be inconsistent with the ICTY's overall goals. President
Cassese was less than specific when he argued, for example, that "a number
of reasons" prompted the decision not to integrate trials in absentia into the
procedural life of the Tribunal.6 In addition, Virginia Morris and Michael P.
Scharf have contended that the Tribunal's posture of opposition to trials in
absentia sprang from differing views among the actors who played key roles
in the ICTY's founding. Some felt that trials in absentia comport with inter-
national law; others feared that such trials could become the norm rather
than the exception and believed that verdicts delivered in absentia would un-
dermine the legitimacy of the Tribunal and the United Nations.6'
5. Rule 61 as a Norm Articulation Device
The Tribunal ultimately may live up to expectations and contribute
constructively to the Yugoslav conflict resolution process. Nonetheless, the
role that it has already played in enunciating international legal norms would
seem to have assured its place in the history of the development of interna-
tional law. Indeed, the widely circulated interlocutory jurisdictional decision
that the Tribunal handed down during the Tadic trial63 contains an exhaustive
and authoritative formulation of current customary international law gov-
erning the conduct of armed hostilities. Rule 61 proceedings may play an
integral role in the Tribunal's ongoing efforts to enunciate legal norms. By
reconfirming an indictment, the judges, it could be argued, have implicitly
acknowledged that the activities allegedly committed by the person subjected
to a Rule 61 proceeding violate international law, whether customary or
codified. Of course, the actual ramifications of norm enunciation are likely
to be downplayed by those, like realist political theorists, who equate power
with the actual ability to enforce decisions and execute punishments. At the
same time, others have attempted to emphasize the ways in which norm
enunciation brings about slight shifts in skewed power relationships. The
61. See First Annual Report, supra note 17, 90.
62. See 1 MORRis & SCHARF, supra note 3, at 214-15. Embedded in this analysis is the idea that
the Tribunal's Statute forbids trials in absentia. For an evaluation of this claim, see the discussion infra
Subsection II.B.2.
63. See Tadic Appeal, supra note 4. For commentary on the significance of this ruling, see
Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Hnanitarian Law, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 238 (1996), which argues that the ruling demonstrates the renewed vitality of customary
law in the development of the law of war. Like treaties, this decision may fmction as evidence of the exi s-
tence of customary international law regarding a given issue. According to Richard Baxter, as long as a
legal instrument "purports to be declaratory of customary international law or if it can be established that
such was the intent of its draftsmen, the treaty may be accepted as valid evidence of the state of customary
international law." R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 1965-
66 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 298 (1968). As such, it "'photographs' the state of the law as at the time of its
entry into force as to individual States... so long as States remain parties to it." Id. at 299.
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Tribunal's drive to achieve this important objective may explain the utiliza-
tion of reconfirmation proceedings.'
6. The Truth Commission Analogy
Rule 61 may allow the Tribunal to assume the role of a truth commis-
sion, an instrument that has been employed in a variety of contexts to docu-
ment the events of a given time period. Toward the end of his opening
statement in the first Rule 61 hearing, Justice Goldstone provided two addi-
tional rationales for publicly reconfirming indictments. First, he explained
that the publicly presented evidence
will constitute a permanent judicial record for all time of the horrendous war crimes
that have been committed in the former Yugoslavia. That public record will assist in
attributing guilt to individuals and be an important tool in avoiding the attribution of
collective guilt to any nation or ethnic group. Some national truth commissions have
been successful in fulfilling such a role by naming accused persons and revealing the
evidence reasonably supporting their guilt.'
In concluding his statement, Justice Goldstone emphasized another, victim-
centered factor:
I have laid much emphasis upon the rights of an accused and of the primary right to a
trial in person. However, there can be no justification at all for ignoring the rights of
the victims and of their families. They, too, have a right to be heard and thereby begin
their own healing process and that of many tens of thousands of victims who will iden-
tify with them.
6
It can be argued that several of the assertions embedded within these
statements rest on questionable assumptions. These include the notions that
the historical record of testimony generated by Rule 61 hearings will be suf-
ficiently comprehensive to contribute to the attribution of individual guilt;
that the experience of testifying, or at least of hearing the testimony of
64. It is, for example, not difficult to imagine a plaintiff in a suit brought in U.S. federal court
under the Alien Claims Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994); attempting to use the fact that the ICTY
had reconfirmed an indictment charging the accused with rape as evidence that a customary international
legal norm proscribing such conduct had emerged. An array of documents, including U.N. General As-
sembly resolutions, multilateral legal instruments, the constitutions and national laws of various states, re-
ports issued by national truth commissions, and legislative resolutions, have been invoked to establish the
emergence of a customary legal norm outlawing or regulating a particular activity. For examples of the
evidence that plaintiffs have proffered in section 1350 suits, see Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,
1541-43 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
If a Tribunal reconfirmed the indictment of an individual who had also been subjected to a section
1350 suit in a federal court, what role would this determination play in establishing the defendant's civil
liability? This question seems particularly timely now that an American federal court has acquired personal
jurisdiction over an individual who has been targeted for Rule 61 treatment by the Tribunal. See Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). Under U.S. law, the burden of proof is lower in civil cases than in
criminal ones. Civil cases employ a preponderance of the evidence standard, whereas in the criminal con-
text, the defendant's guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, it could be argued, as-
suming that the victims and actions allegedly committed are the same in both suits, that the reconfirmation
of the indictment would conclusively establish the defendant's civil liability.
65. Nikolic Opening Statement, supra note 37, 12.
66. Id. 15.
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someone with similar experiences, can initiate or further the healing process
of victims; and that the Tribunal will accomplish these ends by incorporating
into its operation methods that have been utilized by truth commissions in
several jurisdictions around the world that work to establish authoritative re-
cords of what transpired during a particular, usually less liberal, time period.
The terms of reference of a body charged with establishing an official
account of past abuses are pivotal to its potential for future success.67 As
Priscilla Hayner has observed of the truth commissions used in several Latin
American countries, the compilation of a representative history of a given
episode depends heavily on the ability of the investigating body to expose
and document a universe of problematic activities that is representative of
what is perceived actually to have taken place.' Commissions with a man-
date to examine only a small number of specifically enumerated offenses or
to expose only those abuses committed by specific actors have not been able
to make the same contribution to a given political community's reconciliation
process as have their counterparts with expansive competencies. 69 Due to the
breadth of its subject matter jurisdiction,7' the ICTY is well-placed to hear
cases involving a vast array of offenses.
Unlike most truth commissions, however, the ICTY may not select the
testimony that will be presented before it. This undermines its ability to
regulate the record it produces. Indeed, the procedural guidelines governing
the Tribunal's operation may, in fact, impede its truth-chronicling efforts.
Some truth commissions in Latin America examined the cases of thousands
of individuals.7 ' Where limited by time or financial constraints, others pur-
posefully selected several dozen individual cases for the historical record
based on their illustrative value and their contribution to the overall repre-
sentativeness of the report later produced. 72 For the ICTY, on the other
hand, the question of whether an indictment reaches the reconfirmation stage
and subsequently becomes part of the assembled historical record is dictated
by discrete procedural imperatives and subject matter constraints. These are
divorced from the interests of the history-compiling function. This reality,
coupled with the fact that the behavior of numerous autonomous actors will
largely determine how and when Rule 61 hearings are held, calls into ques-
tion the likelihood that the ICTY will be able to use the advantages of its
broad mandate and prosecutorial powers to create a historically representa-
67. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,
16 HuM. RTs. Q. 597, 636-37 (1994).
68. See id. at 637.
69. See id. at 616.
70. See sources cited supra note 4.
71. The Argentine National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons was presented with
8960 cases, and its Chilean counterpart received 3428 cases for processing. See Hayner, supra note 67, at
645-46.
72. The Commission on the Truth in El Salvador reviewed the details of 22,000 killings, tor-
tures, and kidnappings. From this massive collection, it selected 32 illustrative cases upon which to base its
report. See Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., International Truth Commissions and Justice, 5 ASPEN INST. Q. 69,
74 (1993).
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five account of the egregious crimes committed during the breakdown of the
former Yugoslavia.
The prospects for Rule 61 proceedings to succeed in promoting the in-
dividual healing process of victims and their associates may likewise be
mixed. According to some procedural justice theorists, participation in a
formal proceeding, for some, amounts not only to a means to a liberating
outcome-namely a form of declaratory relief-but to an end in itself." Such
experiences, for example, could have beneficial psychological effects on
victims. One observer has noted the importance in victim-centered proce-
dures of "people being able to tell their story fully before a decision maker
who is perceived as neutral, honest and attentive."' The process of testify-
ing on a dark chapter in one's life may have a cathartic effect for that indi-
vidual.75 In theory, Rule 61 proceedings afford the victims as well as sur-
viving family members and friends a valuable opportunity to be made as
emotionally whole as possible.
The capacity of Rule 61 hearings to resuscitate those who have been
traumatized by the fighting in the former Yugoslavia depends on who plays
the role of decisionmaker.76 Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-Arriaza have
argued that although representatives of international bodies may validate vic-
tims' stories, the possibility that the experience of testifying before such
bodies will spur the recovery of victims is minimized unless authorities asso-
ciated with the wrongdoing in question publicly accept the truth-compiling
body's conclusions: "[I]t is not simply the compilation of the report that
matters; equally important to success with respect to redress for victims is
how, and by whom, the report is presented and how the state receives it."77
Such observations provide the beginnings of a framework for evaluat-
ing whether the ICTY, when it conducts a Rule 61 hearing, is capable of
functioning as a positive force in the lives of those who have been trauma-
tized by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Actual examination of this
question would seem to yield depressing insights.78 The ICTY enjoys a rela-
tively low level of legitimacy among many of those believed to be responsi-
ble for violations of international humanitarian law that took place in the re-
gion, a fact that seems to undermine the Tribunal's capacity to alleviate vic-
tims' pain.
Intertwined with the question of whether Rule 61 proceedings are capa-
ble of constructing an authoritative account of the massive criminal wrong-
doing that was visited upon the former Yugoslavia is the issue of whether it
73. See sources cited infra note 194.
74. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Punishment, Redress, and Pardon: Theoretical and Psychological
Approaches, in IMUNrTY AND HUMAN RIGrrs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACICE, supra note 3, at
13,21.
75. See id. at 19.
76. For more on the advantages and disadvantages of international sponsorship of truth commis-
sions, see Hayner, supra note 67, at 642-43.
77. Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in
Latin America, in 1 TRANSrrONAL JUSTICE 262, 276 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
78. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON SEC. AND COOPERATION IN EURoPE, supra note 3, at 13.
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should attempt to achieve this end. This question is especially pertinent if it
is felt that the record being compiled by these hearings implicitly assigns in-
dividual responsibility for the offenses committed. The operation of any truth
commission gives rise to profound due process issues. For instance, several
such bodies have published the names of those whose wrongdoing is well
substantiated.79 This approach, however, seems problematic so far as af-
fording appropriate safeguards to the accused. After all, it is possible that
evidence supporting allegations of illegal activity may come from unnamed
sources and that the accused will not be afforded an opportunity to challenge
the evidence.
Such deficiencies may be minimized by the fact that many truth com-
missions are quasi-judicial entities. Indeed, those who support identifying in-
dividual violators could quite convincingly argue that failing to do so is to
allow impunity to continue its reign. Concerns about the legal rights of those
named can be dismissed by stressing that truth commissions may not directly
deprive individuals of their property or liberty. Others, however, including
Chilean Commissioner Jos6 Zalaquett, have argued that naming names is the
"moral equivalent" of convicting someone without due process.A0 Several
bodies that adopted this posture of restraint decided to submit names of ac-
cused individuals to judicial authorities for possible subsequent prosecution."1
One observer has argued that, legal niceties aside, "the publication of a per-
son's name . . . is popularly understood to indicate their [sic] guilt." 2 This
argument would be particularly compelling if a desire to benefit the general
population, rather than a narrow segment of the academic or legal commu-
nity, animated the creation of truth commissions.
Unlike truth commissions, the ICTY can imprison individuals. It is
thus crucial that its actions survive at least a minimalist form of due process
scrutiny. The Tribunal has argued repeatedly that Rule 61 hearings do not
result in conclusive findings of guilt.' The assertion that these proceedings
can be used to create a historical record of the crimes committed and provide
victims with a limited form of redress without simultaneously affecting the
legal position of the accused appears conceptually flawed. However, this as-
sertion also points to a degree of tension among the various goals and princi-
ples undergirding the Tribunal's work.
7. The Evidentiary Dimension of Rule 61
Because many forms of evidence, including the testimony of victims
and witnesses, can be admitted during Rule 61 proceedings, they can be seen
as opportunities for Tribunal judges to take notice of evidence proffered by
79. See Hayner, supra note 67, at 648-50.
80. See 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
xxxii (1993).
81. See Hayner, supra note 67, at 648.
82. See id. at 648-50.
83. See Voice of the Victims, supra note 37, at 2.
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the Prosecutor. As argued above, the introduction of information that tends
to incriminate the accused during these hearings before the eyes of the world
may lessen the trauma of those who suffered abuse in the former Yugosla-
via." At the same time, there are a variety of more pragmatic reasons for the
speedy introduction of information that tends to incriminate the accused. For
example, evidence tends to degrade over time. Witnesses may forget impor-
tant facts and details about the actions of the accused or the context in which
the alleged violations took place. They may also die from natural causes. 5 In
the case of the Tribunal, which operates in a politically charged environ-
ment, the possibility that witnesses will be deliberately targeted by indicted
individuals or their supporters cannot be ruled out. Although the Tribunal
has taken steps to protect those who come forward to testify,86 even the most
sophisticated witness protection programs managed by domestic law en-
forcement authorities may sometimes be compromised.'
Although it is possible to argue for a mechanism that funnels important
evidence into the public domain, the fact that this occurs as a result of Rule
61 proceedings may cause some to regard them as problematic. Indeed, it
can be argued that the proceedings authorized by this procedural rule amount
to free discovery for individuals who, after being subjected to a Rule 61 pro-
ceeding, are taken into the Tribunal's custody and tried. The evidentiary
showings that a Rule 61 proceeding implies would provide counsel for the
defendant with a remarkable glimpse of the Prosecutor's case against his or
her client. In addition, Rule 61 hearings may undermine the credibility of
witnesses were they also to take part in subsequent trial proceedings. It is
quite natural for people to narrate their experiences in different ways, espe-
cially if a significant amount of time separates their recitals.8 This tendency
84. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
85. Interestingly, these concerns recently served as part of the basis of a U.S. Supreme Court
decision not to delay a suit charging the U.S. President, Bill Clinton, with sexual harassment. See Clinton
v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1651 (1997) (ruling that "delaying trial would increase the danger of prejudice
resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of witnesses to recall specific facts, or the poss i-
ble death of a party"). Courts trying criminal cases also have invoked the degradation of evidence to justify
trying defendants in absentia. In United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1972), for example, the
Second Circuit noted that "the greater the delay between the charge and the trial date, the greater the likel i-
hood that witnesses will be unable to appear or that their memories will have faded and their testimony will
be less convincing." Id. at 1209. Academics have echoed the judicial concern that degraded evidence may
thwart criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Com-
ments on the International War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 267, 269 (1994) (stressing importance
of freshness and immediacy of eyewitness testimony).
86. President Cassese has stated that
protecting witnesses against possible physical attacks is a major concern of the [Witness
Protection] Unit, which has sought and received expert advice on this matter. The Tribunal
does not have its own protection force, but relies on Governments to provide such protec-
tion to witnesses whose security is deemed to be at risk.
Second Annual Report, supra note 32, 117; see also Third Annual Report, supra note 32, 118.
87. See Communications Daily, WARREN PUB., INC., Apr. 8, 1992, available in 1992 WL
2544659 (raising "possibility that Justice Dep[artment] witness protection program records could be com-
promised to disclose identities and locations of protected individuals").
88. This is especially likely to be true if the accused is not present when the witness testifies ini-
tially but does appear at a subsequent proceeding. The alleged tormentor, simply by being present, may
intimidate the witness, thereby affecting his or her narration.
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increases the probability that inconsistencies between the individual's origi-
nal and later versions will appear. Any skillful defense lawyer will, in turn,
be expected to exploit these inconsistencies.
D. Subjects of Rule 61 Proceedings to Date
The presence of politically relevant personalities among Rule 61 sub-
jects lends added credibility to the claim that this mechanism has played a
key role in the Tribunal's efforts to attain its overarching strategic objec-
tives. For instance, one reconfirmee, Milan Martic, led a breakaway Serbian
enclave in the Krajina, a part of Croatia, where he is alleged to have violated
international humanitarian law. This entity, however, ceased to exist in the
wake of a successful Croatian military offensive called Operation Storm that
took place in early August 1995.9 Even more infamous are Radovan Karad-
zic and Ratko Mladic, who dominated the Bosnian Serb power structure at
the height of the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They have consistently
been two of the leading antagonists in the region's unfolding political drama,
although their influence has begun to wane.'
While the prominence of these individuals explains their inclusion, it is
unclear why other former Yugoslav newsmakers have not been targeted for
Rule 61 treatment. Nor does it seem that the remaining five individuals are
immediately distinguishable from the other lesser-known figures who have
been indicted by the Tribunal. 9
1. The Situation of Targeted Individuals and Their Victims
Rule 61 provides a contingency for the ICTY when there has been a
failure to execute an arrest warrant. Given this, those subjected to these
hearings may be thought to reside in the components of the former Yugosla-
via that have evolved into full-blown members of the international commu-
nity. U.N. organs have encountered problems interfacing with non-state en-
89. See War Crimes Court Opens Martic Heating, UPI, Feb. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File.
90. See William Drodziak, Top Serbs Charged with War Crimes, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1995,
at A17. The decision to hold Rule 61 proceedings for Radovan Karadzic, a heavyweight in Bosnian Serb
politics, and Ratko Mladic, the military commander of the Bosnian Serbs, is easily explained, Their
political power essentially immunizes them from arrest; simultaneously, the images of both men have been
beamed around the world since the early 1990s, which ensures that any legal moves taken against them will
attract unrelenting publicity. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both figures by virtue of their
command positions are potentially liable for the atrocities committed to further the efforts to create an
ethnically pure Serb territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
91. Of the 77 suspects publicly indicted by the Tribunal, eight (Martic, Karadzic, Mladic,
Dragan, Nikolic, Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, Veslin Sljivancanin, and Ivica Rajic) have been subjected
to Rule 61 proceedings. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 Indictments
(visited Oct. 3, 1997) <http://www.un.org/icty/list2.htm>. Mikolic and Rajic occupied relatively low
rungs in the command structure of the armed forces of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, respectively;
Mrksic, Radic, and Sljivancanin had achieved high ranks in the Yugoslav army at the time they allegedly
committed the offenses in question. See Alister Bull, UN Tribunal to Hear Vukovar Massacre Case,
REUTERS, Mar. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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ities. 2 If the Tribunal could not show that a credible attempt had been made
to serve the accused with an arrest warrant, the utilization of the Rule 61 de-
vice clearly would be premature.' Evidence exists that the Tribunal has ex-
perienced difficulty coordinating the logistics of transmitting warrants. 4
Such challenges, however, do not seem to have affected the Tribunal's se-
lection of subjects for Rule 61 hearings. Exactly half of these subjects origi-
nate from non-state entities: Nikolic, Rajic, Karadzic, and Mladic were
thought to be based in such jurisdictions.
The fact that only one reconfirmee, Rajic, is a non-Serb is not surpris-
ing. 5 More startling is the ethnic profile of the victims. Even though Bos-
nian Muslims are widely believed to have borne the brunt of the fighting in
the former Yugoslavia,96 four of the eight reconfirmees were involved in ac-
tivities that specifically targeted Croats. But, since three of the reconfirmees
were involved in the same incident-the violations of international humani-
tarian law that allegedly took place in the wake of the Serb attack on Vuko-
var-the disproportionate number of Serb reconfirmees ultimately may prove
misleading.
Another reason for the preponderance of Croatian victims may be that
the majority of the fighting in this country took place early in the conflict.
The relative stability in Croatia since early 1992 has permitted possible in-
vestigative actions by Tribunal personnel at an early point in the structure's
existence. Meanwhile, in terms of timing, the acts that served as the factual
predicates for the reconfirmation hearings held to date were evenly spread
over the course of the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, with 1991, 1992,
1993, 1994, and 1995 each seeing at least one incident.
92. See 1 SYDNEY D. BAn.EY, How WARS END: THE UNrED NATIONS AND THE TERMINATION
OF ARMED CoNFUCr, 1946-1964, at 21 (1982) (arguing that "the Organization is so constructed that its
organs prefer to deal with states rather than with dissident political organizations, insurgent groups, libera-
tion movements, communal minorities, and the like").
93. For an indictment to be reconfirmed, the Prosecutor must make a showing "that all reason-
able steps to effect personal service" have been taken. Current ICTYRules, supra note 3, Rule 61(A)(i).
94. See Second Annual Report, supra note 32, at 24 (characterizing efforts to complete personal
service as "delicate and difficult").
95. Mikolic, Karadzic, and Mladic are Bosnian Serbs, Martic is a Croatian Serb, and Rajic is a
Bosnian Croat. The other three indictees are Serbs from the Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro). See The Accused, The Allegations; War Crimes Tribunal Indicted 56 Men in Atrocities, WASH. Posr,
Dec. 18, 1995, at A17.
96. See Roger Cohen, CIA Report on Bosnia Blames Serbs for 90% of the War Crimes, N.Y.
TIMS, Mar. 9, 1995, at As (reporting that Serbs committed 90% of "ethnic cleansing" that took place in
Bosnia and citing conclusions drawn by Human Rights Watch that Serbian forces had committed "most
egregious and overwhelming number of violations").
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2. The Original Indictment of Individuals Subjected to Rule 61 Pro-
ceedings
Nikolic was the first person involved in the fighting in the former
Yugoslavia to be charged with violations of international humanitarian law. 97
He allegedly committed these violations during his tenure as commander of
the Susica camp in Bosnia.98 Eleven months separated his indictment and re-
confirmation proceeding, which was the first to be held by the ICTY. The
next Rule 61 proceeding, held for Martic, who was the forty-third individual
to be indicted, took place in February 199 6."° Seven months elapsed be-
tween these two events. 01
3. Nature of the Alleged Criminal Wrongdoing Perpetrated by the
Subjects of Rule 61 Proceedings
One might ask whether Rule 61 hearings have been used to sanction or
deter a variety of discrete forms of criminal wrongdoing that took place in
the former Yugoslavia. It is true that some of the subjects of Rule 61 pro-
ceedings are accused of committing particularly ghastly crimes that received
intense media coverage. Three of the defendants-Mrksic, Radic, and
Sljivancanin-occupied key positions in the command structure of the Bel-
grade-based Guards Brigade of the Yugoslav army. This force allegedly re-
moved
261 non-Serb men from the Vukovar hospital and transport[ed] . . . them to a farm
building in Ovcara, two miles from Vukovar, where they were beaten for several
hours.
Later, the prisoners-described in the indictments as "wounded patients, hospi-
tal staff, soldiers and Croatian political activists"-were taken in groups of 10 to 20 to
a site near the farm where Yugoslav soldiers and Serb paramilitary gunmen under
Mrksic's command shot and killed them.in
97. See Tom Squiteri, Trying Bosnia's War Crimes, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 1995, at Al (noting
that "proceedings against Nikolic are being conducted under Rule 61, which permits the court to take evi-
dence against an individual and brand them [sic] an 'international fugitive' subject to arrest").
98. See A War Crimes Court Made Its First Indictment in the Yugoslav Conflict, WALL ST. J.
EuR., Nov. 8, 1994, at I (reporting that "[the Yugoslav War-Crimes Tribunal... indicted Dragan Niko-
lic, commander of the notorious Susica Camp set up by Bosnian Serb forces .... ").
99. See Yugo War Crimes Court Holds First Public Sitting, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 8,
1994, available in 1994 WL 9634555 (noting that "the war crimes tribunal here handed down its first in-
dictment against Dragan Nikolic, a Bosnian Serb who is still on the run, who allegedly commanded a d e-
tention camp in Susica in northeast Bosnia").
100. See War Crimes Tribunal Issues Warrant for Serb's Arrest, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 9,
1996, at A4.
101. See NATO Peacekeepers Kill Serb War-Crimes Suspect; Another Seized in New Get-Tough
Approach, STAR TRw., July 11, 1997, at A7 (noting that "[tihe tribunal indicted this Croatian Serb [Milan
Martic], who led rebel Serb forces in Croatia, on July 25, 1995, for allegedly ordering May 1995 shelling
of Zagreb").
102. William Drozdiak, U.N. Tribunal Indicts Officers in '91 Massacre, VAsH. POST, Nov. 10,
1995, at A31.
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Others are associated with actions that, although brutal, became par for the
course in the savage fighting that took place between 1991 and 1995. Rajic,
for example, has been "accused of leading the troops that attacked the
mountain village of Stupni Do in central Bosnia, killing at least 16 Muslim
civilians in October, 1993. "1°3
Given the prevalence of rape and other sex crimes in the violations of
international humanitarian law that have taken place in the former Yugosla-
via, it is surprising that of the eight individuals subjected to Rule 61 pro-
ceedings, only Karadzic and Mladic were accused of this category of of-
fense. The Tribunal repeatedly has stressed its commitment to prosecuting
sexual assault and rape. According to former Tribunal President Cassese,
"[i]n order conscientiously to address the prevalence of sexual assault alle-
gations committed in the former Yugoslavia .... a legal adviser for gender-
related crimes has been appointed. The adviser, as a member of the Prose-
cutor's secretariat, reports directly to the Prosecutor and the two Deputy
Prosecutors. "'04
In its decision to reconfirm Nikolic's indictment, the judges invited the
Prosecution to amend the charges against him to include accusations of sex-
ual assault. According to Judge Claude Jorda, "[t]he Trial Chamber feels
that the Prosecutor may be well-advised to review these statements carefully
with a view to ascertaining whether to charge Dragan Nikolic with rape and
other forms of sexual assault, either as a crime against humanity or as war
crimes. "105
4. The Subsequent Activities of Subjects of Rule 61 Proceedings After
Their Alleged Commission of Criminal Wrongdoing
Since their alleged criminal activity, some of the eight reconfirmees
have faded into relative obscurity. Rajic, for example, has become a local
politician in the central Bosnian town of Kiseljak since the end of the fight-
ing in the region."ca Others went on to become more influential actors in the
Balkans. By July 19, 1995, Mrksic, who had been named commander of the
Croatian Serb forces, launched an offensive against the neighboring Bihac
103. Roy Gutman, Croats Condemned for Prisoner Release, NEwSDAY, Dec. 8, 1995, at A18.
104. Second Annual Report, supra note 32, 44.
105. Nikolic Indictment, supra note 8, 33. Following the Prosecutor's presentation of evidence
against Karadzic and Mladic during Rule 61 proceedings, Judge Jorda called upon the Prosecutor to "ex-
pand last year's charges of genocide against ... [the two] in light of detailed evidence produced before the
court by its investigators and testimony by a Muslim survivor and an admitted executioner involved in the
Srebrenica killings." Randal, supra note 38, at 1. It could be argued that, by taking these steps, the French
judge subverted the criminal prosecution process by questioning its ability to function as "an independent
judicial arbiter interposed between the police [or prosecuting authority] and the accused." LAW REFORM
COMM'N OF CAN., THE CHARGE DOcuMENT IN CRIMAL CASES 3 (1987). In a sense, the Chamber's ac-
tion brought about a reversal of roles in the parts that the prosecution and judges normally play in common
law jurisdictions when charges are lodged against the accused. By formally recommending that the indict-
ment be amended, the judges placed the prosecution in the position of having to evaluate or judge whether
such an action was warranted.
106. See John Pomfret, Bosnia's War Criminals Pose Dilemma for NATO Troops, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 16, 1995, at All.
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pocket-at the behest of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, according to
Western officials."7
Ii. THE PROPRIETY OF RULE 61
As it cast about for a strategy to pressure politically powerful members
of the international community, the Tribunal presumably sought to develop a
lawful approach that could be reconciled with the demands of justice in con-
texts, such as the former Yugoslavia, where the political landscape has
proven to be susceptible to radical transformations.
A. The Tribunal and International Human Rights in the Shadow of the
Post-World War II Prosecutions
Compared with the prosecutions brought by the Nuremberg Tribunal in
the wake of Germany's defeat after World War II, the ICTY faces intense
pressure to conform to international human rights norms.' 08 The Nuremberg
Tribunal's inattention to human rights can be partly attributed to the novelty
of this concept. Indeed, the idea that a given authority's interaction with
those within its jurisdiction should even register on the radar screens of those
not part of it was a residue of the massive Nazi denials of individual and
group rights before and during World War II."'9 Moreover, some years had
to pass before the notion of human rights could become entrenched in the
operation of the international system.
The Nuremberg Tribunal's relative inattention to basic due process
concerns also stemmed from the absence of international human rights stan-
dards." 0 Indeed, it was not until after these trials that the U.N. General As-
sembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' To a large
extent, this document functioned as an aspirational statement of purpose in
the area of human rights. Twenty years then elapsed before the adoption of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)," which
107. See John Pomfret, Prescription for More War in Bosnia, WASH. PoST, Aug. 12, 1995, at
Al. Similarly, by November 1995, one of Mrksic's deputies, Sljivancanin, was commanding a Yugoslav
army brigade. Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian president, later promoted him to full colonel. See
Drozdiak, supra note 102, at A31.
108. For a comparison of the procedural protections guaranteed to Nuremberg and ICTY defen-
dants, see James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law
in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 654-57 (1993).
109. See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights lmv, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RGHTs PttAcncns 3, 5 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992). In a sense, this lack of
concern cut both ways. States were generally free to treat their citizens in any way they saw fit. Intern a-
tional organizations had similarly pronounced degrees of freedom of action in the way that they dealt with
individuals accused of criminal wrongdoing.
110. As Judge Goldstone has noted, "[w]e cannot merely dust off the rather skeletal evidentiary
and procedural rules used at Nuremberg. International human rights law is essentially a post-Nuremberg
development ... ." Judge Richard J. Goldstone, The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A
Case Study in Security CouncilAction, 6 DUKE J. CoMp. & INT'L L. 5, 9 (1995).
111. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
112. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
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contains more specific standards as well as reporting requirements and an
optional monitoring mechanism." 3 Following the entry into force of the
ICCPR, states and NGOs, acting through the United Nations, have worked
to define with greater specificity the rights of persons and collectivities.
11 4
Regional efforts to promote human rights have also proliferated since World
War H115
The Tribunal is one of the heirs to this legacy." 6 In his report to the
Security Council on the creation of an international tribunal to prosecute
criminal wrongdoing committed in the former Yugoslavia, the U.N. Secre-
tary General asserted that
[i]t is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally recog-
nized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its proceedings. In
the view of the Secretary-General, such internationally recognized standards are, in
particular, contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.Y
7
Two somewhat contradictory impulses, it can be argued, prompted this
concern that the ICTY protect human rights. First, consistency demands
strict adherence to human rights standards." 8 In their dealings with members
of the international system, international organizations like the United Na-
tions often stress the importance of respecting the rights of individuals and
groups. When these same entities have positioned themselves to deprive per-
sons of these same rights, they would confront intense criticism if their op-
eration could not be squared with basic human rights protections.
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
113. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Optional Protocol), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter ICCPR Optional Protocol].
114. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1448 (1989); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39146, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No.
51, at 197, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985); Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13;
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
115. See Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599
(1986) (assessing strength of various international human rights regimes).
116. The multilateral peace operations that the United Nations has established around the world
also must exist in the shadow of this entity's concern for human rights. Numerous NGOs have taken the
United Nations to task for fhiling to establish procedures to discipline its own personnel who stand accused
of criminal wrongdoing. See generally AMNS INT'L, PEACE-KEEPING AND HUMAN RIGHTS 32-34
(1994) (proposing institutional responses to abuses by U.N. personnel); HUMAN RiGHTS WATCH, TIm
LOST AGENDA: HuMN RIGHTS AND U.N. FIWD OPERATIONS (1993) (criticizing U.N. operations in Cam-
bodia, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Iraq).
117. ICTYStatute, supra note 9, 106.
118. This desire for consistency explains the revulsion many felt when revelations surfaced that
soldiers attached to peace operations directed by the United Nations and the Economic Community of West
African States had engaged in activities that would have been clearly illegal had they been committed dur-
ing military operations undertaken under the auspices of national authorities. See, e.g., Canadian Charged
in Death of Somali, PHOENIX GAZETT, Jan. 17, 1995, at AlO (reporting that "charges of racism and bru-
tality involving Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia surfaced again this week in a courtroom").
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Meanwhile, cynics might contend the international community's de-
mand that the Tribunal adhere to human rights norms represents a bid to
keep the ICTY weak. By prohibiting trials in absentia and embracing a pre-
sumption of innocence, the Security Council placed a number of obstacles
between the Tribunal and the successful prosecution of persons accused of
criminal activity in the former Yugoslavia. Convicting a person of criminal
wrongdoing usually implies the deprivation of the individual's liberty, an
outcome which, until recently, only state action could legally generate. This
procedural straightjacket may also be viewed as a reaction against the per-
ceived excesses of the Nuremberg trials, which some saw as victor's jus-
tice.a
19
Prompted by one or both of these concerns, the Secretary General, in
drafting the Tribunal's Statute, integrated into it a number of protections for
the accused. Among these is a provision that apparently prohibits trials in
absentia.Y2
B. Rule 61 and Trials in Absentia
1. Two Sides of the Same Coin?
Whether Rule 61 is in keeping with legal provisions like article 22 of
the Tribunal's Statute and article 14 of the ICCPR depends on the extent to
which it functions as a disguised trial in absentia. There are several key dif-
ferences between Rule 61 hearings and conventional trials in absentia. First,
Rule 61 proceedings do not generate authoritative determinations of guilt or
innocence. According to Justice Goldstone, "[a]t the cost of repetition, [the
Rule 61 proceeding] ... is not a trial in absentia and the primary reason for
the issue of an international warrant of arrest is to achieve the objective of
bringing the accused for trial."12 1 President Cassese has echoed this view,
noting that
[a] solution to the problem of being unable to bring an accused before the Tribunal was
found, taking into account the Tribunal's decision not to allow trials in absentia, by
creating a special procedure-rule 61 proceedings.
119. Cf. Henry T. King, The Judgments andLegacy of Nuremberg, 22 YALE J. INT'LL. 213, 216
(1997) (arguing against notion that Nuremberg was "born of the 'spirit of vengeance'" and in favor of
characterization of Nuremberg as "right and ... just") That the designers of the Tribunal may have drifted
too far in one direction is suggested by the fact that the statute of the proposed permanent international
criminal court does not grant as many protections. In one of its incarnations, this document, for example,
allowed trials in absentia in some instances. See infra note 136.
120. According to article 21(4) of the Statute, "[in the determination of any charge against the
accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees,
in full equality: ... (d) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assi s-
tance of his own choosing." ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 21(4). One observer has noted that, concern-
ing the rights of the accused, the real difference between the ICTY and the prosecutions mounted immed i-
ately after World War II "will lie in what is outside the text. For example, the way the tribunal may be e x-
pected to improve upon the performance of the earlier courts will be in how it and the registry implement
those guarantees, for example, by providing documents to defendants in a timely fashion." O'Brien, supra
note 108, at 654.
121. Nikolic Opening Statement, supra note 37, 13.
[Vol. 23: 231
1998] Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in the Balkans 259
Proceedings under rule 61 do not abrogate the accused's right, under the statute,
to be present at his trial, since the proceedings are not a trial nor do they result in a
judgment. If the accused were ever to surrender to custody, a whole new trial would
take place in his presence, and he would be presumed innocent notwithstanding the rule
61 finding.22
Neither are convictions handed down if the indictment is reconfirmed.12
Although formal distinctions between trials in absentia and Rule 61
proceedings may exist, it is possible that reconfirmation hearings function as
trials in absentia in all but name. First, the fact that witnesses are allowed to
testify publicly at Rule 61 proceedings gives them a trial-like quality.124
Similarly, Judge Jorda has argued that "[w]e have taken the French concept
[of trial in absentia] to its limits, which has allowed us to establish a proce-
dure which, while not judging the accused in absentia, will allow us to make
public the charge against him." 25 As noted previously, Justice Goldstone has
pointed out that the evidence presented at these hearings
will constitute a permanent judicial record for all time of the horrendous war crimes
that have been committed in the former Yugoslavia. That public record will assist in
attributing guilt to individuals and be an important tool in avoiding the attribution of
collective guilt to any nation or ethnic group.'2
This statement could be read as a tacit admission that the reconfirmation
process functions as a trial in absentia. It is unclear what mechanism, if any,
would be used to attribute guilt for the crimes exposed as a result of the Rule
61 proceeding. The public could use the record that emerges from these
hearings to make its own determinations as to who bears responsibility for
the breaches of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia.
More problematically, if the Tribunal closes down, courts emerging out of
122. Second Annual Report, supra note 32, 197-98. President Cassese's language is poten-
tially problematic. For example, his argument that "a whole new trial would take place" if the accused
were taken into custody implies that the earlier reconfirmation proceeding did, in fact, function as a trial.
This statement also exhibits a degree of inconsistency. For example, Cassese first asserts that the Tribunal
decided to prohibit trials in absentia, then that "proceedings under rule 61 do not abrogate the accused's
right, under the statute, to be present at his trial." Id. Of course, the ICTY Statute is a creature of the Se-
curity Council.
123. Instead, the decision to reconfirm has been termed a "finding." See id. 198.
124. One of the risks of this liberal evidentiary rule is that witnesses may not feel as constrained
as the does Prosecutor to ensure that the accusations made against the defendant fall within the Tribunal's
subject matter jurisdiction, are specific, and otherwise conform to the Tribunal's rules of evidence. Without
defense counsel present to object to improper testimony, there would seem to be few restraints on what
becomes part of the judicial record in Rule 61 proceedings. This might be particularly unfair to the defen-
dant. According to the Law Reform Commission of Canada:
An accusation of a crime lodged against an accused is one of the most serious steps our s o-
ciety can take against an individual. The mere fact of being charged can have enormous re-
percussions on the accused's life.... Thus, we require a charge to be in writing, so that
vague or unspecific allegations against a person cannot take the form of gossip through the
community: a written document setting the matter in black and white must exist.
LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 105, at 3.
125. Sabine Gillot, Tribunal Will Reveal War Crimes Evidence Against Absent Defendants,
AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 11, 1994, available in LEXS, News File, ARCNWS Library (quoting
Judge Jorda).
126. Nikolic Opening Statement, supra note 37, 12.
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the rubble of this region, which may not be inclined to show the same con-
cern for the rights of criminal defendants as had the ICTY, might use the
product of Rule 61 proceedings as a basis for convictions in absentia. It is
also unclear whether Justice Goldstone's statement pertains to moral or legal
culpability for criminal wrongdoing. It is easier to make the case that the re-
confirmation procedure does not function as a trial in absentia if Goldstone
was referring only to moral guilt.
2. Trials in Absentia and International Law
Even if Rule 61 proceedings are the functional equivalent of trials in
absentia, it is not clear that the Tribunal's Statute should be construed as bar-
ring them.127 For example, indications exist that the Tribunal's judges do not
read the Statute as imposing an absolute ban on trials in absentia. Interest-
ingly, President Cassese has referred to the "Tribunal's decision not to allow
trials in absentia by creating a special procedure. " " This phrasing, of
course, implies that while the Tribunal elected not to include trials in absen-
tia in the procedural regime that would govern its operation, it nonetheless
possessed the power to employ this type of proceeding. 19
These signals from the ICTY cannot be reconciled with sentiments ar-
ticulated by the Secretary General in his report to the Security Council. In
this communiqu6, he invoked article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, which mandates
that trials be conducted in the defendant's presence, to defend his decision to
include language apparently prohibiting trials in absentia in the Tribunal's
statute.1' According to the Secretary General, "[t]here is a widespread per-
ception that trials in absentia should not be provided for in the statute as this
would not be consistent with article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights .... It is not clear, however, that trials in absentia
127. As noted below, this is the French position on whether trials in absentia are prohibited by
the Tribunal. See infra text accompanying note 162.
128. Second Annual Report, supra note 32, 198.
129. Media reports support the inference that Tribunal judges feel they may employ trials in ab-
sentia. Indeed, one journalist has reported:
At the Hague, the president of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal said the UN court is re-
thinldng its ban on trials in absentia, in part because it has not been able to get its hands on
Karadzic and Mladic. Judge Antonio Cassese of Italy said that since the court's 1994 start-
up, judges have discussed the idea of trials in absentia for suspects who cannot be caught.
Julius Strauss, Dig Indicates Massacre of Bosnia Civilians, Cin. SuN-TwES, July 13, 1996, at 12.
130. According to this provision, "[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against the ac-
cused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in
full equality: ... (d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assi s-
tance of his own choosing[.]" ICCPR, supra note 112, art. 14(3)d.
131. ICTY Statute, supra note 9; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of
Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National
Constitutions, 3 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 280 (1993) ("Trials in absentia are prohibited by the
ICCPR"); O'Brien, supra note 108, at 656 (concurring with Secretary General's position); Michael P.
Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31
TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 91 n.121 (1996) (asserting that trials in absentia are generally disfavored under interna-
tional law). But see Wedgwood, supra note 85, at 269 (arguing that "Secretary-General indulged in an
over-reading in his claim that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights forbade the trial of
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are banned by article 14 of the ICCPR or by the Tribunal's statute. 132 For
example, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the body charged with ensur-
ing the ICCPR's implementation by the parties that sign its Optional Proto-
col, 133 has noted that there are situations in which trials in absentia are per-
missible."M Similarly, some individuals involved in the formation of a per-
manent International Criminal Court (ICC) have questioned whether interna-
tional law truly exhibits no tolerance for this type of legal proceeding. Ac-
cording to commentary on the debate over the component of the ICC's Stat-
ute regulating the use of such proceedings,
[s]ome members were strongly in favour of drawing some distinctions, as regards, in
particular, three possible situations: (a) the accused has been indicted but is totally un-
aware of the proceedings; (b) the accused has been duly notified but chooses not to ap-
pear before the Court; and (c) the accused has already been arrested but escapes before
trial is completed. Most of those members thought that while in hypothesis (a), an ac-
cused person should not be judged in absentia, in cases (b) and (c) a trial in absentia is
perfectly in order .... 13s
This document's framers have used article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR as a base-
line for formulating the procedural protections that international law man-
dates for criminal defendants.136
alleged Yugoslav war criminals not physically present in the Hague"); Diane F. Orentlicher, Arrest the
War Criminals, WASH. PosT, Sept. 24, 1996, at A17 (arguing that trials in absentia "can be justified, if at
all, only as a last measure if it proves impossible to arrest" war criminals); Herman Schwartz & Lloyd N.
Cutler, Try Them in Absentia, WASH. PosT, Aug. 27, 1996, at All ("The rules of the present International
War Crimes Tribunal also permit such trials. A defendant has the right to be 'tried in his presence,' but he
plainly waives that right if he fails to present himself for trial."). Similarly, Louis Beres has made the more
general argument that "anyone who is charged with a criminal offense and offered but declines the oppor-
tunity to defend himself in person, is normally not mistreated under law." Louis R. Beres, Iraqi Crimes
and International Law: The Imperative to Punish, 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 335, 353 (1993).
132. For example, Rule 80(B) of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides that
"the Trial Chamber may order the removal of an accused from the courtroom and continue the proceedings
in his absence if he has persisted in disruptive conduct following a warning that he may be removed." Cur-
rent ICTY Rules, supra note 3. This suggests that even the Tribunal's judges did not consider the language
barring in absentia proceedings absolute. Various national courts have held that such trials in absentia do
not impermissibly undermine the rights of the accused; rather, they amount to a voluntary waiver by the
defendant of his right to be present at trial. See infra Subsection lI.B.4.
133. See ICCPR Optional Protocol, supra note 113.
134. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comments Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the
Covenant, reprinted in M.NFRED NowAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AD PoLmcAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 860 (1993). Similarly, Mbenge v. Zaire featured a legal challenge by a Zairian to prosecu-
tions against him and his family brought while he was residing in Belgium. The Committee asserted that
article 14(3)(d)
cannot be construed as invariably rendering proceedings in absentia inadmissible irrespec-
tive of the reasons for the accused person's absence. Indeed, proceedings in absentia are in
some circumstances (for instance, when the accused person, although informed of the pro-
ceedings or sufficiently in advance, declines to exercise his right to be present) permissible
in the interest of the proper administration of justice. Nevertheless, the effective exercise of
the rights under article 14 presupposes that the necessary steps should be taken to inform
the accused beforehand about the prosecutions against him.
Mbenge v. Zaire, No. 16/1977, 2 SELECTED DEcISIONs OF THE HUMAN RiGHTS CoMMrrrEE UNDER THE
OpnONAL PROToCoL 76, 78, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, U.N. Sales No. E.89XIV.1 (1990).
135. United Nations Int'l Law Comm., Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court, 33 I.L.M. 253, 281-82 (1994).
136. According to article 44(I)(h) of the ICC's draft statute,
In the determination of any charge under this Statute, the accused is entitled to a fair and
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3. European Human Rights Arrangements and Right to be Present
During the Criminal Prosecution Process
Regional and even municipal legal standards of law, which are rou-
tinely proffered by practitioners litigating questions of law before the Tribu-
nal and invoked by this body's judges, play a key role in gauging the inter-
national legal system's receptiveness to trials in absentia. Like the U.N.
Human Rights Committee, European bodies charged with maintaining com-
pliance with regional human rights conventions have found that trials in ab-
sentia are justified in certain settings.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)'37 contains mini-
mum fair trial standards very similar to those in article 14 of the ICCPR.
Article 6(3)(c) of the ECHR states that every person charged with a criminal
offense has the right
to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he
has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the inter-
ests of justice so require.'
On several occasions, parties have called upon the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights to determine whether this provision constitutes an ab-
solute prohibition of trials in absentia. In Colloza and Rubinat v. Italy, this
body declared that
undoubtedly ... Article 6 § 3(c) does not secure the accused the right to be personally
present in all circumstances. His absence may, for example, be due to special circum-
stances bound up with the way the trial is organised, such as the attitude he himself
adopts to the hearing.
139
In the same case, the Commission ruled that a state conducting a trial in ab-
sentia does violate article 6 of the ECHR when it hands down a final judg-
ment not open to appeal or review. 140
public hearing... and to the following minimum guarantees: ... (h) to be present at the
trial, unless the Court, having heard such submissions and evidence as it deems necessary,
concludes that the absence of the accused is deliberate.
Id. at 281.
137. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
openedfor signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
On April 24, 1996, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe voted to invite Croatia to
become its fortieth member. Such membership would have required Croatia to accede to the treaty within a
year. On May 14, however, the Committee of Ministers of the Council took the unprecedented step of i n-
tervening to block this membership invitation. General human rights and rule of law concerns, intimidation
and harassment of the news media, and Zagreb's lack of cooperation with the Tribunal were invoked to
explain the postponement. See Laura Silber & Anthony Robinson, Tudman Furious Over European Bar,
FIN. TIMES, May 16, 1996.
138. ECHR, supra note 137, at 228.
139. Colozza & Rubinat v. Italy, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26; id. at 29 (1983).
140. In finding Italy in violation of the Convention for having refused to retry two individuals
convicted in absentia, the Commission declared that "[m]atters would be different if an accused convicted
in absentia without his express consent had the opportunity, once he had actually learned of the conviction,
of having the proceedings on the merits of the case reopened at his request." Id. § 126, at 30. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights also reached this conclusion, holding that:
When domestic law permits a trial to be held notwithstanding the absence of a person
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Like the European Commission on Human Rights, the Council of
Europe's Convention mechanism, the Council of Europe's Committee of
Ministers, adopted norms governing proceedings held in the absence of the
accused. In 1975, it formulated a resolution on this subject.' In keeping
with ECHR case law, this document leaves room for trials in absentia only
in cases in which the accused's presence is not indispensable.142
The position on trials in absentia carved out by the other major Euro-
pean human rights standard-setting body, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), is less clear. Article 5.17 of the Document
on the Human Dimension' guarantees the right to be tried in one's presence
in phrasing similar to that of article 14 of the ICCPR. 14 Unlike the ECHR,
which created a commission and court to which individuals may apply for
legal remedies in human rights abuse cases, the OSCE Human Dimension
procedure provides a diplomatic mechanism through which states may raise
human rights complaints. "The Mechanism," as it is known, has resulted
primarily in the establishment of fact-finding missions. Little information is
available on the substance of the complaints that it receives. 45 Although the
OSCE does not interpret human rights standards, it is worth noting that this
body appears to view the ICCPR as an example that states ought to follow.146
4. Trials in Absentia and Criminal Procedure in Internal Legal Or-
ders
The proposition that it is permissible for trials in absentia to be held in
limited circumstances has also met with favor in authoritative decisions is-
sued by national courts, including those of states whose legal traditions gen-
erally regard trials in absentia as unjust.147 The collective weight of this out-
'charged with a criminal offense' who is in Mr. Colozza's position, that person should,
once he becomes aware of the proceedings, be able to obtain, from a court which has heard
him, a fresh determination of the merits of the charge."
Id. § 29, at 15.
141. See Resolution on the Criteria Governing Proceedings Held in the Absence of the Accused,
Res. (75) 11, Comm. of Ministers (May 21, 1975), reprinted in RESOLUTIONS BY THE COMMrrEE OF
MINSms RELATNG TO CRME PROBLEMS (1977).
142. Seeid.
143. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1306-09 (1990).
144. See ICCPR, supra note 112, at 171.
145. See Kevin Boyle, Europe: The Council of Europe, the CSCE, and the European Community,
in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS RACrlCE, supra note 109, at 133, 155-56.
146. Given the crucial role that the OSCE has been assigned in implementing the civilian side of
the Dayton Agreement, interaction between it and the ICTY may be on the rise. See Dayton Agreement,
supra note 35, Annex 10, at 146 (describing role of OSCE in civilian implementation of agreement).
147. See James G. Starkey, Trial in Absentia, 54 N.Y.B. J. 30, 30 (1982) (noting that "right of
an accused to be present at his trial is traceable to the earliest days of Anglo Saxon law"). One scholar of
the policies that undergird this legal tradition's aversion to trials in absentia has questioned whether the ban
on them still makes sense:
when the right arose in Anglo-Saxon times, it is true that presence was a requirement, not a
privilege. Jurisdiction was as dependent on presence in criminal trials as in civil, for origi-
nally both were in the nature of a private action brought by one individual against another
for redress of private wrong. Also, the early mode of trial, by ordeal or by battle, and the
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put of domestic judicial tribunals around the world lends further support to
the argument that the use of such proceedings by a multilateral legal struc-
ture comports with emergent trends in the international legal system. 4' Par-
ticularly outside the United States, the presumption against trials in absentia
either never existed or seems to be waning.
a. The United States
American case law has recognized an increasing number of exceptions
to the common law's outright ban on trials in absentia. In Diaz v. United
States,'49 the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the U.S. Constitution' per-
mits trials to proceed if those who stand accused have voluntarily absented
themselves from them.' Similarly, Illinois v. Allen"' stands for the propo-
general practice of rendering judgment immediately upon return of verdict, both argued for
presence. Lastly, since defendants could not have counsel in ancient times, maintenance of
any pretense to an adversary system necessitated presence. But the evolution of criminal
procedure has undermined these justifications and the privilege of presence is now retained
primarily for the defendant's benefit and for the indirect societal interest in providing for his
protection.
The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 30, 97-98 (1970) (citations omitted).
148. We discuss the approach to the trial in absentia issue taken by American, French, English,
Australian, and former Yugoslav domestic law. Several considerations explain this selection, First, much
of the law at the domestic level around the world traces its origins to either the common law, which was
born and bred in England, or civil law legal tradition, whose evolution was shaped by developments in
France. Australia and the United States are common law countries. The former Yugoslavia fell into the
civil law camp. With the exception of the former Yugoslavia, nationals from each jurisdiction currently
function as judges at the ICTY. Our decision to examine the law of the former Yugoslavia should be obv i-
ous. When actors in this region engaged in criminal conduct, they presumably knew that prosecutions
against them could be initiated, which, depending on their permissibility, might incorporate trials in absen-
tia. Thus the Tribunal's utilization of this device would seem to be justified if persons in the former Yug a-
slavia expected to be subject to trials in their absence.
149. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
150. In many respects, the language of article 14 of the Covenant tracks that of the U.S. Consti-
tution's Sixth Amendment, which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. Because all of the Sixth Amendment's guarantees except the right to a jury trial
are contained in article 14 of the ICCPR, the Amendment's interpretation, while not authoritative, might
inform the construction given to the ICCPR.
151. Citing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Court stated that it
was not "consonant with the dictates of common sense that an accused person, being at large upon bail,
should be at liberty, whenever he pleased, to withdraw himself from the courts of his country and to break
up a trial commenced." Diaz, 223 U.S. at 457.
152. 397 U.S. 337 (1970). For commentary on this case, see The Supreme Court, 1969 Term,
supra note 147, at 90-100. When the Netherlands acceded to the ICCPR, it reserved "the statutory option
of removing a person charged with criminal offence from the courtroom in the interests of the proper co n-
duct of the proceedings." NOWAK, supra note 134, at 764. That the Dutch government felt compelled to
make such a reservation is one of the few pieces of evidence that support the proposition that article
14(3)(d) contains an absolute prohibition on trials in absentia. As noted previously, the Tribunal has estab-
lished that trials in absentia are permissible when the behavior of the defendant would otherwise prevent
the trial from going forward. See Current ICTYRules, supra note 3, Rule 80.
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sition that a disruptive defendant waives his or her constitutional right to be
present during his trial."' In Crosby v. United States,"M the Court did hold
that the U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure15 barred the initiation of
criminal proceedings in the absence of the defendant. 56 Yet a U.S. Court of
Appeals in Kirk v. Dutton"5 7 recently held that criminal proceedings in Ten-
nessee, which are not regulated by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
may proceed without the defendant's presence as long as he or she knows
that a criminal prosecution has begun.5  Finally, in Brewer v. Raines,15 9 the
constitutionality of sentencing a defendant in absentia was upheld."°
The outcomes in Diaz, Allen, Crosby, Kirk, and Brewer demonstrate a
willingness on the part of U.S. courts to push the trial-in-absentia envelope.
Indeed, at some point judges may need to determine whether defendants need
to be present at any juncture during the criminal prosecution process. It cur-
rently seems conceivable, especially in state proceedings, that the defendant
would not have to be in custody during the indictment, at the beginning of
153. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 345-47.
154. 506 U.S. 255 (1993).
155. See FED. R. CPmM. P. 43(a) (requiring that defendant be present for most trial stages, with
certain limited exceptions).
156. See Crosby, 506 U.S. at 258-61. Crosby, perhaps, is more significant for the question that
was not decided: Because the Court found Rule 43 "dispositive," it did not reach the petitioner's claim that
"his trial in absentia was also prohibited by the Constitution." 506 U.S. at 262.
157. No. 94-5725, 1994 WL 561146 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1129
(1995).
158. As the Sixth Circuit noted, its determination represented only the latest in a series of hold-
ings that state criminal trials can begin if the defendant is not present. To defend its decision, the Tennessee
trial court noted that the absent defendant was being tried along with six other codefendants who were in
state custody. Since joinder was necessary, delaying the proceedings until the defendant had been appre-
hended would have amounted to a denial of the other defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
See 1994 WL 561146, at *2-5. Given that article 21(1)(c) of the Tribunal's Statute mandates that those ac-
cused of violating international humanitarian law "be tried without undue delay," ICTY Statute, supra note
9, at 1198, it seems possible that the Tribunal might face the same situation confronted by the trial court.
Rule 82(B) of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides for separate trials when a commu-
nal indictment has issued. See Current ICTY Rules, supra note 3, Rule 82(B). To avoid holding a trial in
absentia for a portion of the defendants, this provision would have to be invoked. It would allow the Tr i-
bunal to sever the trial of an accused already in custody from proceedings for those who had yet to be
transferred to The Hague. Such persons, fully aware of the Tribunal's wariness of trials in absentia, might
argue that they be tried jointly with those who stand accused, but were still absent. At the same time, d e-
laying the proceedings until the accused was taken into the Tribunal's custody, which might take years or
never transpire, would violate the Statute's guarantee of a speedy trial to those already detained. See Cur-
rent ICTYRules, supra note 3. Thus, the Tribunal's prohibition on trials in absentia may diminish its over-
all ability to administer justice when it is important that defendants be tried in groups. Moreover, severance
might, in the end, only complicate the work of the Tribunal. The Second Circuit, another complex judicial
structure, has commented on the strains that ordering separate trials can impose on courts. See United
States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in exceptional circumstances, trial in
absentia is justified when public interest outweighs the voluntarily absent defendant's interests).
159. 670 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1982).
160. See id. at 119. But see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (stressing centrality
of formal arraignments with the defendant present in "whole system of adversary criminal justice"). In re-
sponse to this decision, one might argue that as long as the accused is apprised of the charge that has been
brought against him, it is unnecessary that he be formally arraigned. Indeed, one American court's state-
ment that there are no "talismanic properties which differentiate the commencement of a trial from later
stages" would seem to apply to the entire criminal prosecution process. Virgin Islands v. Brown, 507 F.2d
186, 189 (3d Cir. 1975).
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and during his or her trial (especially if he or she is disruptive), and for sen-
tencing. On the other hand, arraignments, which usually require the presence
of the accused, continue to play a vital role in criminal proceedings.61
b. France
During the negotiations that served as the basis for the establishment of
the Tribunal, France argued for allowing trials in absentia. 62 This stance
dovetailed nicely with the permissibility of such proceedings in the French
judicial system.63
c. United Kingdom
The stance against trials in absentia taken by British courts has hardly
been absolutist. In Lawrence v. The King,"6 The Privy Council held that
there has to be considered the alteration and recording of the sentence in the absence of
the accused. It is an essential principle of our criminal law that the trial for an indict-
able offense has to be conducted in the presence of the accused; and for this purpose
trial means the whole of the proceedings, including sentence. There is authority, for
saying that in cases of misdemeanor there may be special circumstances which permit a
trial in the absence of the accused, but on trials for felony the rule is inviolable, unless
possibly the violent conduct of the accused himself intended to make trial impossible
renders it lawful to continue in his absence. The result is that sentence passed for fel-
ony in the absence of the accused is totally invalid.' 6'
Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Jones (R E W),' 66 which was de-
cided almost forty years later, adopted language from Regina v. Abra-
hams,"6 an 1895 decision, where it was held that while
as a matter of law trial for misdemeanor may proceed in the absence of the defendant,
it must be not be understood that such a course would in these days meet with ap-
161. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
162. See French Proposal, supra note 11, at 346-47. In the end, this stance lost out to the Italian
government's views on the establishment of the Tribunal. According to articles ll(1)(a) and ll(1)(d) of the
statute proposed by Rome, "[e]very person who is charged with a crime. . . has the right .... [t]o be
judged within a reasonable period of time at a public hearing appearing personally and being represented
by a counsel. ... " Italian Proposal, supra note 11, at 378-79.
163. France, a party to the ICCPR, does not appear to regard its use of trials in absentia as con-
trary to its article 14(3)(d) obligations. In acceding to this instrument, it did enter a reservation "concerning
articles 9 and 14 to the effect that these articles cannot impede enforcement of the rules pertaining to the
disciplinary regime in the armies." NowAK, supra note 134, at 754. France also has signed the ICCPR's
Optional Protocol, which allows the United Nations's Human Rights Committee to receive and review
communications from individuals within its jurisdiction who have alleged violations of this treaty. The
French legal system's continued use of trials in absentia has not been challenged before the Human Rights
Committee. Thus, the French position with regard to the Tribunal's Statute, that it "does not explicitly ex-
clude the possibility of judgment in the defendant's absence, but does not actually provide for it" appears
consistent with the view that its domestic use of trials in absentia comports with its ICCPR commitments.
French Proposal, supra note 11, at 347.
164. [1933] App. Cas. 699 (P.C. 1933) (appeal taken from Nigeria) (U.K.).
165. Id. at 708.
166. [1972] 2 All E.R. 731 (Eng. C.A.).
167. [1895] 21 V.L.R. 343 (U.K.).
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proval. I think that not only has an accused person a right to be present during the
hearing of any proceeding against him, but as a rule, which should never be departed
from except under special circumstances, he is also bound to be there.... All that we
are here deciding, in my opinion, is that the presiding judge may in misdemeanors pro-
ceed without the presence of the prisoner where the absence is voluntary. He has in law
a discretion, but that discretion should be exercised with great reluctance, and with a
view rather to the due administration of justice than to the convenience or comfort of
anyone.' 6s
d. Australia
Like their English counterparts, Australian courts have identified situa-
tions in which trials in absentia do not offend Anglo-Saxon conceptions of
the procedural protections it is just to extend to individuals accused of crimi-
nal offenses. In R. v. McHardie and Danielson,169 for example, the Court of
Criminal Appeal for New South Wales, after reviewing English and New
South Wales practice regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings in the
defendant's absence, concluded
[n]otwithstanding the general principle that at an indictable offense trial before a judge
and jury the accused's presence is normally a prerequisite to a fair trial, his failure to
appear after the trial has started, through his escape from lawful custody, can correctly
be described and found to be a waiver of his right to be present at his trial; that the trial
judge has a discretion as to whether he should continue his trial, or discharge the jury;
that in New South Wales this principle applies to a trial whether it be one for a cate-
gory known as a felony, or for a category known as a misdemeanor; and that in any
event, the distinction formerly applied for different considerations in cases of felony, as
opposed to misdemeanor, are no longer of any legal significance in the present con-
text. 170
e. The Former Yugoslavia
The judicial system of the former Yugoslavia likewise permitted trials
in absentia in a limited set of circumstances.' It did so as a signatory with-
out reservation to the ICCPR. 72 Moreover, since gaining their independence
168. Id. at 353.
169. (1983) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 733 (Austl.).
170. Id. at 745.
171. Under article 275 of the Yugoslav Code of Criminal Procedure, an accused could be tried in
his absence "only if [the accused] has fled or is otherwise not amenable to justice." YUGOSLAV CoDE OF
CRIM. PROC. art. 275 (n.d.). Of course, proposals supporting an inclusion of Yugoslav domestic law in the
subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY ultimately were rejected. See ICTYStatute, supra note 9, 36. It is
clear, however, that the Prosecutor tends to be sensitive to approaches taken by Yugoslav law to various
issues. In addition, article 24 of the Tribunal's Statute does explicitly refer to national law in the guidelines
for establishing appropriate penalties. See id. art. 24. When the need for a sentence to be handed down
arises (which has already occurred), the Prosecutor will be called upon to make a recommendation regard-
ing its duration.
172. Yugoslavia signed the ICCPR on June 2, 1971. It seems evident that Belgrade took its obli-
gations and duties under this instrument seriously. For example, on April 17, 1989, it invoked the
ICCPR's article 40(I). This provision empowers states to derogate from its commitments under this agree-
ment in times of exceptional public emergency. The Yugoslav government forwarded to the Secretary
General a "Derogation from Articles 12 and 21 in the Covenant in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo as
from 28 March 1989. The measure became necessary because of disorders which led to the loss of human
lives and which had threatened the established social system." Reservations, Declarations, Notifications
and Objections Relating to the CCPR and the Optional Protocols Thereto, reprinted in NOWAK, supra note
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 23: 231
in 1991 and 1992 respectively, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have both
retained trials in absentia.
5. The Legacy of Misconstruing the Tribunal's Statute
The above survey suggests that states, including signatories of the
ICCPR, have allowed trials in absentia in some situations. The same liberties
that national authorities have granted themselves have not worked their way
up to international judicial bodies like the ICTY. This court must exist, how-
ever, in a context where an absolutist reading of the prohibition on criminal
proceedings in the absence of the accused reigns supreme. Given the rela-
tively vast reservoir of coercive power into which states can tap, it would
seem that national judicial authorities could abuse trials in absentia more
readily than could their counterparts at the supranational level. On the inter-
national level, the practical result of a trial in absentia is likely to be limited
to a criminal conviction being entered against the defendant and a reaffirma-
tion of the need for his or her arrest. Meanwhile, a conviction returned in
the defendant's absence by a domestic prosecuting authority might serve as
the basis for depriving this person of a bundle of rights, including the rights
to vote or to own property. Additionally, the conviction in absentia could
entitle the victims of the accused to civil damages from the defendant's es-
tate. Ultimately, the presence of states eager to preserve their sovereignty at
all costs in the process that created the ICTY may explain why such an ex-
pansive ban on trials in absentia was read into its Statute. Indeed, allowing
the Tribunal to preside over trials in absentia might have served as a prece-
dent for the procedures used by the International Criminal Court which, in
theory, will be able to try individuals of any nationality.'
By vesting defendants with the protections that multilateral human
rights conventions grant those who are accused of criminal wrongdoing, the
United Nations has enhanced the prestige of the guarantees that individuals
can rely upon to facilitate their defense. The ICTY's commitment to ensur-
ing fair trials has also bolstered the legitimacy of legal instruments like the
ICCPR. Theodor Meron, for example, has asserted that "[t]he incorporation
of the norms under Article 14 of the Covenant in the statute of the first in-
ternational criminal court since the post-World War H tribunals stands as a
significant precedent that enhances the importance of these norms per se and
134, at 813. The following spring, a similar derogation was announced due to further conflict in Kosovo.
On both occasions, a cessation of the crisis underlying the state of emergency brought an end to Yugosl a-
via's derogation from its ICCPR duties. See Intifada in the Balkans, EcONOMIsr, Apr. 1, 1989, at 40-41
(describing factual background of derogations).
173. See Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Over-
comes Past Objections, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 436 (1995) (emphasizing that "A.B.A. Task
Force and the 1953 U.N. Commission proposal both agree on personal jurisdiction. This proposal stated
that both the state where the crime was committed and the state of nationality of the accused must consent
to jurisdiction of the international criminal court in order for the court to obtain personal jurisdiction over
the individual").
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in the context of international criminal tribunals."'"7 By construing without
justification key human rights provisions in a way that represents a notable
departure from the manner in which they have been traditionally interpreted
both by international bodies and national judiciaries, the Secretary General
hardly enhances the stature of this regime.
This malfunctioning of the international lawmaking process justifies a
search for lessons so that it does not happen in the future. The nature of the
process that produced the Tribunal's Statute may explain why article 14 was
interpreted to impose an outright ban on the conduct of criminal proceedings
outside the defendant's presence. Relatively few actors played key roles in
this drama. Although views on the establishment of a tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia were submitted by a variety of players, including member states
and NGOs, the Secretary General drove the drafting of the Tribunal's Stat-
ute, which was approved without modification by the Security Council.
This gloss regarding trials in absentia may also be linked to the fact
that the ICTY was created very quickly. Only three months separated the
entries into force of Security Council Resolutions 808 and 827. In addition,
besides being engaged in the effort to set up the Tribunal, the United Nations
was working to address a number of other issues, including the military and
political dimensions of its involvement in the former Yugoslavia as well as
an overly ambitious attempt to pacify and reconstruct a deteriorating Soma-
lia. It was also presiding over complicated peace operations in Cambodia,
Mozambique, and El Salvador that continually required attention. Further-
more, the Security Council issued no less than eighteen resolutions between
the time that the Tribunal was formally proposed and its establishment.
These dealt with such complex contexts as Angola, Rwanda, Liberia, the
Western Sahara, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. Given the presence of all of these
pressing items on its agenda, it is not surprising that article 14 was miscon-
strued. 175
174. Theodor Meron, Comments: War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of Interna-
tional Law, 88 Am. J. INT'L. L. 78, 84 (1994).
175. A number of sources report on these U.N. endeavors. See Sam Kiley, Angola Oil Town
Falls to Rebels, TIMES (LONDON), May 29, 1993, available in 1993 WL 10579691 (reporting that "Jonas
Savimbi's rebel army captured the strategic Angola oil town of Soyo and fired at American offshore plat-
forms as the United Nations's special representative to Angola called for UN military intervention to pre-
vent mass starvation"); Moyiga Nduru, Liberia: United Nations Urged to Deploy Blue Berets, INTR PRESS
SERv., May 7, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2541247 (reporting that "[a] Liberian rebel leader has called
on the United Nations to deploy their 'blue beret' peacekeeping forces in the war-torn Liberia to replace
Nigerian ECOMOG forces-which the rebels have accused of taking sides"); Peacekeeper: U.N. Somalia
Takeover Tuesday, AP, Apr. 30, 1993, available in 1993 WL 4538725 (reporting that "[t]he United Na-
tions will take over the U.S.-led Somalia mercy mission on Tuesday, the top U.N. peacekeeper said Fri-
day"); Jonathan Power, If U.N. Gets More Support, It Can Deliver, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 20,
1993, available in 1993 WL 6902908 (stating that former Zaire and Rwanda requested U.N. assistance to
avoid slides into civil war); Martin Schram, In Political Wars, Truth Is a Casualty, NEWSDAY, Apr. 1,
1993, at 106 (referring to "report of the United Nations Truth Commission on the massacres of thousands
of civilians by our government allies in El Salvador in the 1980s"); UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Says Azeri Civilians Are Fleeing Through Treacherous Mountain Tracks, FIN. Tuem, Apr. 7, 1993, at 3
(noting that "[t]ens of thousands of Azeri civilians are fleeing through treacherous mountain tracks from
fierce fighting which continued yesterday between Azerbaijan and Armenia"); U.N. Pails Back in Combo-
dia, WASH. PosT, Apr. 21, 1993, at A23 (reporting that "[s]ix unarmed U.N. military observers left two
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In contrast, the fuller reading of the trial in absentia issue by the actors
framing the Statute for the proposed International Criminal Court may be
due to the fact that the process producing it was more deliberative and
marked by the active involvement of a relatively large cast of characters. It
has also unfolded at a slower rate.176
C. Rule 61 and the Achievement of Justice in the Former Yugoslavia
Too many inquiries into whether the Tribunal will be able to obtain a
just settlement'" in the former Yugoslavia see this process as driven solely
by the ICTY.' 78 Rather, whether the Tribunal is ultimately successful will
depend on many factors-some already determined' 79-in addition to the
number, timing, and substance of its rulings. For example, the lay of the
land in the post-conflict Yugoslav order will shape the Tribunal's ability to
make a concrete contribution to the cause of transitional justice. The differ-
ence it might make would be diminished if the regimes that emerge proved
to be undemocratic, predisposed to mistreat discrete minorities, and uncoop-
erative with the Tribunal and the other dimensions of the international com-
munity's presence in the former Yugoslavia. Whether the entities in this re-
gion decide to pursue this agenda, in turn, will be shaped by millions of in-
dividual decisions, taken at the grassroots level, in corridors of power, and
districts controlled by Khmer Rouge guerrillas because of growing hostility from the radical group"); Uru-
guayan and Zanbian Troops Arrive in Mozambique, AGENCE FRANCE PRnSSE, Apr. 28, 1993, available in
1993 WL 10716627 (noting that forces from Uruguay and Zambia "will form part of the planned 7,000-
strong United Nations peacekeeping force in Mozambique").
176. The nature of the process that led to the Tribunal's creation has had important consequences
for its ability to function effectively. For example, the Security Council's decision to spearhead the creation
of the Tribunal is widely thought to have offended the General Assembly, even though many members of
this body, especially Muslim countries, had been very supportive of the project. Even though it favored a
tribunal, the General Assembly attempted to highlight its relevance and register its disapproval of the way
in which the Tribunal was founded by delaying the ICTY's funding for several months. As the preceding
discussion suggests, this appears to be what happened in the case of the Security Council's efforts to inte-
grate article 14 of the Covenant into the procedures of the Tribunal. See lain Guest, Will U.N. Smother Its
Conscience? War Crimes Tribunal May Not Receive Adequate Funding, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 20, 1994,
at 11 ("Now, at a time of shrinking U.N. budgets, the General Assembly is considering a request from the
Secretariat for $28.4 million to cover the Tribunal's work in 1995. Last Wednesday, the panel that advises
the General Assembly on budgetary matters decided to postpone a decision until spring.").
177. By "just settlement," we do not mean the achievement of the kind of Bosnia-Herzegovina
that is expressed in various Security Council resolutions. Rather, this concept pertains to the project's con-
sistency with the imperatives ofjustice in situations undergoing basic political shifts.
178. W. Michael Reisman has argued that undergirding the creation of mechanisms such as the
ICTY is a faith in
[judicial romanticism, the belief that if a court could only be established, it would bring
law and order to the most unruly political situation . . . . It assigns almost magical, a I-
chemical qualities to what a court can do, if it is only established and only given the chance
to issue its judgments.
W. Michael Reisman, Establishment of a Regional Human Rights Arrangement in the Asian and Pacific
Region: Experiences of Other Regions, in HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTI/CENTRE FOR HUMAN
RIGHrS, UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL HUMAN RIGMTS ARRANGEMENTS ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 23 (1996).
179. The fact that the ICTY is a creation of the international community will shape its capacity to
bring peace and justice to the Balkans.
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by actors on the world political stage as they interact with the protagonists in
the drama unfolding there.
Although the Tribunal is certainly not the only unknown quantity in the
transitional justice equation, neither is it a passive spectator. Rather, what
ultimately emerges will depend, in part, on the decisions it makes and the
strategies it employs to implement them. The desirability of efforts made by
judicial entities to achieve justice in transitional contexts can be evaluated
with a number of yardsticks. One is a given project's consistency with the
rule of law. The degree to which members of the community undergoing the
transition are induced to participate in the search for justice and the sophisti-
cation of the strategy the undertaking is allowed to pursue are also relevant
factors to consider in judging the propriety of a particular initiative.
Some of these inquiries are likely to unfold with relative ease. 1 0 Others
are more difficult to execute successfully. Moreover, the fact that the Tribu-
nal is composed of many constituent parts-including judges, a large prose-
cutorial staff, an extraordinarily powerful Registry with a set of interests that
do not necessarily mesh with those of the other components of the Tribunal,
and procedural rules-counsels against making hasty generalizations about its
overall capability to make a lasting contribution to a just transition in the
former Yugoslavia. Rather, this determination will emerge from individual
examinations of the varied aspects of this structure's operation. These are
likely to proliferate with the passage of time and as the Tribunal begins to
leave a more substantial jurisprudence in its wake. Toward that end, what
follows is intended as a preliminary attempt to gauge the extent to which one
feature of the ICTY-its utilization of Rule 61 proceedings-dovetails with
the demands of transitional justice. This determination will be driven, in
part, by the function of Rule 61, an issue that we have discussed in consider-
able detail. If, for example, Rule 61 acts primarily to perpetuate the Tribu-
nal's existence, it is difficult to see how it has any relation to the achieve-
ment of a just settlement in the former Yugoslavia.' 8'
1. The Rule of Law
The Tribunal's overall operation seems to conform readily to the prin-
ciple of the rule of law, which can be conceptualized as a fidelity to existing
rules. Indeed, various aspects of the process associated with the Tribunal-
including the Security Council's deliberations on the Statute and the Tadic ju-
risdictional ruling"-have been characterized by an extreme sensitivity to
the notion that the acts the Tribunal is competent to prosecute be explicitly
proscribed by international humanitarian law at the time that they were al-
180. If common ground on a conception of the rule of law exists-a big "if-assessing a given
project's consistency with the rule of law emerges as a relatively straightforward task.
181. If this were indeed the case, the only way to see Rule 61 as furthering the transitional justice
agenda would be if a just settlement could not be achieved immediately.
182. See Tadic Appeal, supra note 4.
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legedly committed.' This stands in marked contrast to other attempts to
settle accounts in transitional contexts, including a German court's invoca-
tion of natural law to justify its decision to convict former East German
military personnel accused of murdering individuals attempting to escape to
West Berlin."8 Ironically, the Tribunal's reliance on Rule 61 hearings may
be something of an exception to its overall faithfulness to the rule of law.185
As already noted, this procedural device has never been used in an interna-
tional context. That this is the case may simply be a reflection of the poverty
of the procedural regime for criminal prosecutions undertaken at the interna-
tional level. 186 More troubling is the fact that nothing analogous to the Rule
61 reconfirmation proceeding forms part of the criminal procedure regimes
utilized at the national level. 1
87
2. Participatory Aspect of Rule 61
A number of commentators have stressed the desirability of efforts to
attain justice that involve the participation of broad swaths of the polity in
which the transition is occurring.188 Participation may function as a means to
183. See IUTY Statute, supra note 9, 34 (stressing importance of no crime without law princi.
pie).
184. Germany: Trial of Border Guards (Berlin State Court, Docket No. (523) 2 Js 48/90 (9/91)),
reprinted in 3 TRANSITONAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 576.
185. It seems overly simplistic to argue that the rule of law only implies an adherence to substan-
tive legal provisions. This view assumes that meaningful distinctions between substance and procedure can
be made. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, in THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 48, 54-55
(Robert M. Cover & Owen M. Fiss eds., 1979) (arguing that procedural rules, in fact, play more fund a-
mental role than substantive rules once legal process is set in motion).
186. See Goldstone, supra note 110, at 9.
187. This, of course, assumes that the Rule 61 mechanism is not a trial in absentia, a position that
the Tribunal has unwaveringly endorsed. If, on the other hand, this device can be equated with a trial in
absentia, there is, as we have argued, precedent for its use by the Tribunal.
188. Efforts to confront the legacy of a given old order exist along a continuum. At one end are
efforts spearheaded by actors hailing from the locale in transition; at the other are efforts undertaken by the
international community. Transitional efforts staffed by a combination of international and indigenous ac-
tors, or only indigenous actors benefiting from technical assistance provided by intergovernmental ar-
rangements and nongovernmental entities, inhabit a twilight zone in the middle. Both Bosnian and non-
Bosnian judges currently sit on that country's constitutional court. See Gary A. Hengstler, Out of the Rub-
ble, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 52 (discussing this structure). See generally Neil J. Kritz, The Dilemmas of
Transitional Justice, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at xxviii (discussing how management of
transitions has come to be handled on international level).
There are a variety of consequences of keeping transitional efforts centered at the international
level. They may be viewed as less partisan than if they were initiated by the political force that reigns s u-
preme in the post-transition era. At the same time, because the Tribunal was established by the Security
Council, which has generally been seen as anti-Serb in the Bosnian conflict, it is unclear whether the Tri-
bunal's ability to be perceived as impartial has been permanently compromised. As the creation of an inter-
national entity, the Tribunal could begin to operate before the emergence of the new order. At the same
time, its operation must conform to international legal principles. Moreover, it is susceptible to shifting
political winds at the international level, which can be quite sudden and severe. For example, a breakdown
in cooperation between members of the Security Council or among different components of the U.N. sy s-
tem--even in an area far removed from the international community's response to the situation in the Bal-
kans--could effectively gut the work of the Tribunal.
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an end. t"9 According to Judith Shklar, for example, the post-World War II
judicial proceedings at Nuremberg,
by forcing the defense lawyers to concentrate on the legality of both the entire Trial
and its specific charges, induced the German legal profession to rediscover and publicly
proclaim anew the value of the principle of legality in criminal law, which for so many
years had been forgotten and openly disdained.' 90
Or, as noted previously, participation may function as an end in itself. For
example, it may have a purging effect on those involved in the effort to
reckon with the prior regime. In transitions from totalitarian systems, where
almost all members of the community played some role in perpetuating the
old order, 9 ' many citizens might publicly need to break their ties to the pre-
vious regime."9 As an entity established by the United Nations, located in
The Hague, and staffed by individuals from the four comers of the globe,
the Tribunal does not provide many opportunities for individuals from the
former Yugoslavia to become involved in the efforts to achieve a more just
post-conflict order in the region."9 Indeed, there is only one notable excep-
tion to this general rule, short of a full-blown trial. Rule 61 hearings, by
providing witnesses and victims with the chance to testify, institutionalize a
small degree of participation by Yugoslav actors into the Tribunal's overall
efforts to achieve justice in this region."
3. Sophistication of the Overall Strategy Pursued to Achieve Justice
In evaluating the desirability of Rule 61 proceedings, attention ought to
be paid to their relationship to the overall objectives of the Tribunal. One of
these was gaining leverage over the disputants by exposing and punishing
criminal wrongdoing. Since its establishment, though, there has been a con-
siderable amount of "mission creep" in the activities undertaken by the
189. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus: Three Factors in Search
of a Theory of Value, in THE STRUCrURE OF PROCEDURE, supra note 185, at 18, 22 (asserting that "a lack
of personal participation causes alienation and a loss of that dignity and self-respect that society properly
deems independently valuable"); Simon, supra note 185, at 64 (noting that "procedures required by such
[U.S. Supreme Court] decisions were justified by their service as expressions of fundamental moral value,
such as individual dignity, trust, equality and fraternity").
190. JunrrH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLrITcALTIRIAIs 165-66 (1964).
191. See Vficlav Havel, The Power of the Powerless, in VACLAV HAVEL OR LIVING IN TRUTH 52
(Jan Vladislav ed. & P. Wilson trans., 1986).
192. See, e.g., Luc Huyse, Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in
Dealing with the Past, in 1 TRANSmONAL JusrIcE, supra note 77, at 340 (noting that "[a]bolishing the
monuments of the past [the statues of the Lenins and the Stalins] is one way to cleanse a society"). Such
undertakings have the added advantage of requiring the participation of thousands of individuals.
193. Besides marginalizing the role that actors could conceivably play in the search for justice in
the Balkans, the Tribunal's physical and institutional separation from this region, as well as the political
processes unfolding in it, may cause it to lose touch with what is possible to achieve.
194. Of course, the question then becomes whether these hearings promote enough participation.
One of the most disheartening aspects of the Rule 61 mechanism as applied to Karadzic and Mladic was the
extent to which the proceedings marginalized victims and their families while giving academics and mili-
tary officers center stage. See Dutch Official Defends Acts of U.N. Troops, Muslims Not Shielded From
Bosnian Slaughter, NEws & OBSERVER, July 5, 1996, at A14 (illustrating high-profile role of military
commander Ton Karremans before U.N. war crimes tribunal).
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ICTY. 95 For example, the Dayton Peace Agreement, which forbids indi-
viduals indicted by the Tribunal to participate in future electoral processes in
the region," 6 effectively pushed the Tribunal into the business of dispensing
administrative justice."9 Similarly, Rule 61 hearings, which retain a pro-
nounced truth commission quality, may allow the ICTY to harness the bene-
fits of this approach to create a more just post-conflict order although, as
discussed previously, plenty of evidence suggests it will not. Of course, even
though it is routinely vilified in the press, "mission creep" is not always
problematic. In the case of the Tribunal, it may enable this entity to pursue a
more dynamic strategy to apportion justice in the former Yugoslavia. Where
the Tribunal is unlikely to obtain a criminal conviction due to a lack of coop-
eration on the part of the relevant authorities, justice may demand that the
potential defendant be sanctioned in some other manner. Indicting the indi-
vidual and subjecting him or her to a Rule 61 hearing allows this goal to be
achieved, albeit in a watered-down form.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has contended that Rule 61 amounts to an innovative at-
tempt by the Tribunal to fulfill its overall mandate: apprehending and trying
individuals who stand accused of violating international humanitarian law in
the former Yugoslavia. A variety of obstacles thwarted the realization of this
goal. First, the Tribunal needed a way to pressure parties in the region and
at the international level that were unwilling participants in its search for
justice in the Balkans. Second, the Tribunal had to ensure the legality of its
solution, including the ban on trials in absentia that formed part of its Stat-
ute. Ultimately, Rule 61 represents an attempt to remain cognizant of both of
these imperatives simultaneously. The fact that the Tribunal has turned to
other strategies, including the use of sealed indictments, to bring those it had
accused into custody points to shortcomings in Rule 61. However, this does
not mean that this procedural device should be regarded as a failure. Rather,
planners of other international attempts to prosecute criminal wrongdoing in
politically fluid contexts would do well to appreciate what can be realized
with a procedure similar to Rule 61.
195. "Mission creep" is a term that has been coined in the context of multilateral peace opera-
tions. It refers to situations in which a military force that has intervened for one reason, such as the deli v-
ery of humanitarian relief supplies, but begins pursuing other goals, such as attempting to track down and
capture a recalcitrant disputant.
196. Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement provides:
No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to
comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any
appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Dayton Agreement, supra note 35, Annex 4, art. IX, § 1, at 151-52.
197. For one attempt to dispense administrative justice at the national level, see Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic: Screening ("Lustration") Law, Act No. 451/1991 (Oct. 4, 1991), reprinted in 3
TRANsIoNALJuSTIcE, supra note 77, at 312.
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